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INTRODUCTION 
On February 5, 2003, NBC broadcast episode 81 of The West 
Wing. 1 The episode dramatized preparations for President Bartlet's sec-
ond inauguration during a crisis that could result in military operations 
in Africa.2 One of the subplots concerned choosing the Bible upon 
which the President would take his oath of office. "I don't have a bi-
* Associate Professor, Barry University School of Law. BA., 197, Columbia University; 
Ph.D., 1983, Cornell University; J.D., 1997, magna cum laude, Indiana University School of 
Law. The author thanks Dean Leticia M. Diaz and the Barry University School of Law for 
awarding him a summer grant to write this Article. Also, thanks to Neelum Arya for pointing 
out the Bible episode from The West Wing. 
1 The West Wing: Inauguration: Part 1 (NBC television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003). 
2 Id. 
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ble," the President says to his aide Josh.3 The following dialogue then 
takes place: 
JOSH: You know, there's nothing that says you have to be sworn in 
on a bible. 
BARTLET: Is that true? 
JOSH: You can be sworn in on a Sports Illustrated swimsuit issue. 
BARTLET: You think that's a good idea? 
JOSH: No.4 
The dialogue introduces a recurring series of vignettes in which the Pres-
ident tries to decide on which Bible he will use for his inauguration 
oath.5 
In his initial search he discovers that the White House library has a 
copy that was once the property of "Donnie's Hotel."6 President Bar-
tlet, who comes from old New England stock, considers using his family 
Bible, which he had donated to the New Hampshire Historical Society.7 
But the Society's Director, Mr. Cravenly, must regretfully deny the re-
quest because, taken out of its climate controlled vault, the Bible would 
warp.8 The President then considers the Bible of Jonathan Edwards.9 
However, this Bible, containing four translations, Hebrew, Greek, Ara-
maic and English, turns out to be extremely large, "the size of a Volk-
swagen."10 Bartlett suggests that holding this Bible while he takes the 
oath would require "the First lady, the Chief Justice, and the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals." 11 The President eventually asks for the Bible 
on which Washington took the first oath of office. 12 However, the New 
York Freemasons, who own that Bible, have rules that the Bible cannot 
3 Tramcript of Episode 81, Inauguration: Part I, WEST WING TRANSCRIPTS (Feb. 26, 2003) 
[hereinafter Tramcript of Episode 81], http://www.wesrwingcranscripts.com/search.php?flag=get 
Transcript&id=8 l &keyword= bible. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. See also The West Wing: Inauguration: Part 2 - Over There (NBC television broadcast 
Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Inauguration: Part 2]. 






12 Inauguration: Part 2, supra note 5. 
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travel by plane, and three masons must accompany it wherever it goes -
requiring four train tickets, including one for the Bible. 13 The 
Freemasons do not make it to the inauguration on time when the Me-
troliner gets stuck in Philadelphia because of frozen tracks. 14 And so the 
President's aides have to scramble to find a copy, 15 much as the or-
ganizers of the first inauguration are said to have done when they real-
ized at the last minute that they did not have a Bible handy for 
Washington to swear upon. 16 
AB it happens, The West Wings playful look at the role of the Bible 
in the President's oath of office anticipated a slight, but definite, dis-
lodging of the Bible as the presumptive choice upon which such oaths 
are sworn. On January 3, 2013, Tulsi Gabbard took her ceremonial 
oath of office as the newly elected representative for the second congres-
sional district of Hawaii. 17 Representative Gabbard thus became the 
first Hindu to serve in the United States House of Representatives, 
swearing her oath on the Bhagavad Gita, the scripture of the Vaishnavite 
branch of the Hindu religion. 18 USA Today noted that when a Hindu 
priest first offered a Hindu prayer in the U.S. House of Representatives 
in 2000, the Family Research Council denounced the event as "one 
more indication that our nation is drifting from its Judea-Christian 




16 Id. The story that the organizers of the first inauguration overlooked providing a Bible 
until the last minute is probably apocryphal. See Winthrop Clarence Bowen, The Inauguration 
ofWashington, 37 CENTURY MAG. 803, 828-29 (1889) ("Just before the oath was to be adminis-
tered it was discovered chat no Bible was in Federal Hall. Luckily Livingston, a Grand Master of 
Free Masons, knew chat there was one at St. John's Lodge in the City Assembly Room nearby, 
and a messenger was dispatched to borrow the Bible .... "). See also George Washington Inaugural 
Bible, MAsoNrc LEADER (Nov. 23, 2010), http://chemasonicleader.com/?p=325 ("[nhe George 
Washington Inaugural Bible has been used for the Inaugurations ofWarren G. Harding, Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, Jimmy Carter, and George H.W. Bush."). Perhaps the appearance of the Bible 
at the inaugurations of Jimmy Career in 1977 and George H.W. Bush in 1989 inspired the 
treatment of the theme in The West Wing. 
17 Stephen Prothero, A Hindu Moment for Congress: Swearing In of New House Member Holds 
Lesson for Politicians, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 2013, at BA, available at 2013 WLNR 243697. 
lB Id. For background on the relationship between the Bhagavad Gica and the Vaishnavice 
branch of Hinduism, see K.P. Nayar, America Cocks Ear for Tulsi's Gita - Hindu, not Indian, a 
Frontrunner, TELEGRAPH (INDIA), Nov. 4, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 23408842; see also 
Vaishnavism: An Overview, in 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 9498-501 (Lindsay Jones, ed. in 
chief, 2d ed. 2005). 
19 Prothero, supra note 17. 
306 CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICS J [Vol. 12:303 
Hindu prayer in the Senate in 2007, protesters from the anti-abortion 
group, Operation Save America, interrupted him, calling on Jesus to 
forgive the nation "for allowing a prayer of the wicked."20 But as to Ms. 
Gabbard's swearing in ceremony, there was little controversy: "[T]he 
nation simply shrugged."21 This grudging acceptance of Hinduism in 
the hallowed precincts of the American government encapsulates a far 
larger struggle by which religious minorities have achieved the accept-
ance of their faiths in one of the most commonplace ceremonies of gov-
ernment: the oath. 
It was not very long before, six years to be exact, that the ceremo-
nial inauguration of Keith Ellison, the first Muslim elected to the House 
of Representatives, set off controversy over his intention to swear his 
oath of office on the Qur' an, when his choice was strongly criticized by 
the conservative radio talk show host Dennis Prager,22 by a member of 
Congress, Virgil Goode,23 and by the American Family Association.24 
The hoopla about Representative Ellison overshadowed the election of 
the first two Buddhists to Congress in 2006, Mazie Hirono from Hawaii 
and Hank Johnson from Georgia,25 as well as the second Muslim to be 
elected to the House, Andre Carson of Indiana.26 
Some questioned whether Mitt Romney might choose to swear the 
presidential oath of office on the Book of Mormon had he won the 
election of 2012.27 This, in spite of Mitt Romney's own words from his 
20 Id 
21 Id 
22 See infra notes 272-290 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra note 278. 
24 See infra note 278. 
25 Luis Lugo, Congress Looks Like the People: When It Comes to Religious Affiliation, Diversity 
Reigns on Capitol Hill, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 2009, at l lA, available at 2009 WLNR 209537; 
Sahar Said, Diversity in Government: On Taking Oaths, FOREIGN PoL'Y BLOGS NETWORK, Nov. 
20, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 2467542. 
26 Lugo, supra note 25; Said, supra note 25. 
27 See, e.g., Dennis Williamson, Perspective: Letters to the Editor, J. GAZETTE, Oct. 14, 2012, 
at l 4A, available at 2012 WLNR 21904178 ("Even if [Romney] takes the oath of office with his 
hand on the Book of Mormon, he will be swearing upon the book of his religious convictions, 
not someone else's, which is a sacred oath we can hold him to."); William Marsden, Presidential 
Inauguration Marks America's Rebirth: Fireworks and Music Usher In Obama's New Term, MON-
TREAL GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 2013, at A23, available at 2013 WLNR 1449284 ("If Mitt Romney 
had won, would he have sworn his oath on the Book of Mormon? How would that have gone 
over?"); Andy Johnston, Q&A on the News, ATLANTA J. & CoNST., Jan. 29, 2013, at B2, availa-
ble at 2013 WLNR 2224383 ("Jana Riess, a religion scholar and co-author of 'Mormonism for 
Dummies,' told CNN.com before the election that she didn't think Romney would have used 
the Book of Mormon to take the oath of office. Romney used a Bible when he was sworn in as 
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2008 address about his religion: "When I place my hand on the Bible 
and take the oath of office, that oath becomes my highest promise to 
God."28 Of course, Romney's speech was notably reminiscent of John 
F. Kennedy's speech in 1960 to address questions about whether his 
Catholic faith would affect his presidential decisions. 29 Indeed, regard-
ing Kennedy's inauguration, it was widely noted that he swore his oath 
on the Douay Bible, the official Catholic translation of the Bible. 30 In 
2005, Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz refused to take her 
oath of office on the copy of the Bible proffered by House Speaker Den-
nis Hastert.31 The refusal set off a search for a copy of the Tanakh, the 
Jewish Old Testament, which Representative Gary Ackerman pro-
governor of Massachusetts in 2003; it reponedly was the same one his father, George, used when 
he was sworn in as Michigan's governor in 1963."); James Rudin, Our Presidents Should Leave 
Their Bibles at Home, THE STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 3, 2013, at 6, available at 2013 WLNR 2716205 
("If Mitt Romney had been elected president, it is possible he would have sworn his oath while 
holding the Book of Mormon."). 
28 Linda Feldman, Romney Moves to Allay Mormon Concern Directly, CHRISTlAN Sci. MONI-
TOR, Dec. 7, 2007, at l, available at 2007 WLNR 24109437. For the text of the speech, see 
Romney's "Faith in America" Address, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, available at, http://www.ny-
times.com/2007/12/06/us/politics/06text-romney.html?pagewanted=all. The Mormon faith re-
veres the Bible as well as the Book of Mormon as sacred scripture, so it is acceptable for a 
Mormon to swear an oath on the Bible. See Jessica Ravitz, What Would a Mormon White House 
Look Like?, CNN BELIEF BLOG (Nov. 2, 2013), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/l l/02/if-
mormons-move-into-the-white-house/. See also Bible, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM 105-
11 (1992) ("The Bible stands at the foundation of the Church of Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
constitutes one of its standard works, and is accepted as the word of God."). 
29 The comparison was noted by Romney himself in his address. "Almost 50 years ago 
another candidate from Massachusetts explained that he was an American running for President, 
not a Catholic running for President. Like him, I am an American running for President. I do 
not define my candidacy by my religion. A person should not be elected because of his faith nor 
should he be rejected because of his faith." Romney's "Faith in America" Address, supra note 28. 
30 See, e.g., Edward T. Folliard, Kennedy Takes Oath of Office: Proclaims a New "Quest for 
Peace'', WASH. PosT, Jan. 21, 1961, at AOl, available at http://www.washingronpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longrerm/inaug/history/stories/ken61.htm ("His left hand rested on a Douay ver-
sion of the Bible, the basic English translation done in the 16th century by Catholic scholars in 
the English College at Douay, F ranee."); Inaugurals of the President of the United States, LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/pihtmllpinotable.html (last visited March 4, 
2014) (indicating that this was the first time a Douay Bible was used for the oath of office at a 
presidential inauguration: "As the first Catholic elected president, Kennedy was the first to use a 
Catholic (Douay) version of the Bible for his oath."). On the origins and development of the 
Douay Bible, see Bernard Ward, Douay Bible, 5 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1901), available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05140a.htm. See also 4 THE NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPE-
DIA 879-80, s.v. Douai (2003). 
3 1 Gabrielle Banks, As Legislative Ranks Become More Diverse, So Do the Books and Wordr 
Used to Affirm Duty to Office, PITTSBURGH PosT-GAZETTE, Nov. 19, 2012, at A9, available at 
2012 WLNR 24655112. On the differences between the Tanakh and the Christian presenta-
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vided.32 For congressional oaths taken on January 23, 2013, lawmakers 
could request a text from the Library of Congress, or they could choose 
from at least nine alternatives on hand for the one-on-one ceremonial 
oath with the House Speaker, John Boehner.33 These included: Catho-
lic, Protestant, and Eastern Orthodox Bibles, the Torah, the Qur' an, the 
Book of Mormon, Hindu Vedas, an ornate box holding Buddhist Su-
tras, and copies of the U.S. Constitution.34 
And a couple of months after Ms. Gabbard's oath, when John 
Brennan took the oath of office as Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, he chose not to swear on any religious text at all, but rather 
swore his oath of office on a 1789 draft of the Constitution, containing 
notes taken by George Washington.35 Mr. Brennan apparently made 
this choice not to suggest any rejection of religion, but rather to demon-
strate that "the United States is a nation of laws."36 This unobjection-
able purpose did not escape the criticism that the particular copy of the 
Constitution he used did not yet provide for the rights to freedom of 
speech or religion, which were not added to the Constitution until it 
was amended in 1791 with the Bill of Rights.37 Mr. Brennan's choice 
was not without precedent. In 1825, John Quincy Adams may have 
taken the presidential oath of office on a volume of laws.38 Kyrsten 
tion of che Old Tescamenc, see The Tanakh, THE JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, hccp://www.jew-
ishvircuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/Tanakh.hcml. 
32 Banks, supra noce 31. The lace Mayor of New York Cicy, Ed Koch, swore his oach upon 
che Tanakh when he served as a Member of Congress, as did Henry Waxman. Id 
33 Stephan Dinan & Tom Howell, Jr., Religious Diversity in Congress Expands List of Holy 
Texts, WASH.TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013, ac AOl, available at 2013 WLNR 287750. 
34 Id 
35 New CM Director Can't Escape Controversy, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE REVIEW, March 10, 
2013, available at 2013 WLNR 6002198. 
36 Id 
37 Id 
38 Donald Kennon, Historical Perspectives on the Inaugu.ral Swearing In Ceremony, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE Oanuary 14, 2009), http://fpc.scace.gov/114510.hcm, scares: ''Adams in his 
diary notes chat he swore the oath on a book oflaws. Again, why did he do char? John Quincy 
Adams was a deeply religious person, hue my interpretation is char he did so because as he points 
our in his diary, he was swearing che oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United 
Scares, so he cook the oath on a book of laws." However, what Quincy Adams wrote in his diary 
is as follows: "The Senate adjourned, and from che Senate-chamber, accompanied by the mem-
bers of chat body, and by the judges of che Supreme Coun, I repaired co che Hall of che House 
of Representatives, and after delivering from che Speaker's chair my inaugural address co a 
crowded auditory, I pronounced from a volume of che laws held up co me by John Marshall, 
Chief J uscice of the Uniced States, the oath faithfully co execute the office of the President of the 
United States, and, co the best of my abiliry, co preserve, protect, and defend che Conscicution of 
the United States." THE DIARY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 1794-1848, at 343 (Allan Nevins 
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Sinema, the only member of the House who admits to no religious affil-
iation at all, took her 2013 oath of office on the Constitution. 39 In-
deed, some members of Congress do not hold any text at all for their 
swearing in.40 
For the purpose of taking an oath, the use of the Christian Bible, 
which includes both the Old Testament (the Jewish scriptures) and the 
New Testament (the scriptures relating to Jesus Christ), or the use of the 
New Testament alone, has been traditional and commonplace in West-
ern culture because Christianity was historically the West's predominant 
religion.41 However, as non-Christians were permitted to participate 
more fully in legal proceedings and to work as government officials, the 
use of other religious texts or symbols, or the non-use of any religious 
artifact at all, has become more common.42 Although Prager, who is 
Jewish, argued that non-Christians could swear on the Bible as the 
source of the values that animate the American government, the imposi-
tion of the Bible as the only means of taking an oath is unacceptable. 
Such a rule would be a religious test, specifically prohibited by the Con-
stitution, 43 as well as a violation of the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause. But aside from this, for many an oath is a personal commit-
ment to tell the truth or keep a promise, so it is appropriate that the 
oath-taker not be coerced into professing a religious belief she does not 
have. 
For most people, the oath long ago became a perfunctory form of 
asserting the truth of a statement or promise with little regard for the 
religious text that supported the truth of the declaration. Nevertheless, 
the Biblical text that accompanies the oath creates a difficulty for the 
oath-taker who places no credence in Christianity. The act of swearing 
upon the religious text conveys the appearance of a personal faith or 
belief in the religion represented by the text. For the individual who 
does not believe in Biblical revelation, the deception is hardly consistent 
ed., reprinted 1969). The quotation suggests Quincy Adams may have simply been reading the 
oath of office from a law book that contained the words of the oath as they are set out in the 
Constitution. 
39 Anita Little, Here's to the Women Who Won, Ms. MAGAZINE, January 1, 2013, at 28, 
available at 2013 WLNR 5003005. Although Representative Sinema states she has no religious 
affiliation, she does nor hold herself our as an atheist. Elizabeth Flock, Noise Control, U.S. 
NEWS WEEKLY, Jan. 4, 2013, at 2, available at 2013 WLNR 277762. 
40 Dinan, supra note 33. 
41 See infta notes 55-66 and accompanying text. 
42 See infta notes 74-107 and accompanying text. 
43 See infta notes 284-285 and accompanying text. 
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with a ceremony meant to represent a commitment to truth telling. In-
deed, any commitment to be truthful based on a religious belief that 
one does not hold would appear to be of little value. In the times that 
required oaths to be sworn upon the Bible, conscientious non-Chris-
tians, as well as Christians with religious objections to oath taking, re-
fused to take an oath on the Christian scriptures, and as a result were 
effectively excluded from legal procedures or public offices.44 
This Article reviews the history of the struggle to remove the obli-
gation to swear an oath with the Bible or with any religious text or 
artifact. In view of that history, the Article concludes that the freedom 
to choose from a variety of religious or secular texts is consistent with 
arguments that favored the adoption of the No Religious Test Clause of 
the Constitution at the ratifying conventions of the states. However, 
the acceptance of this freedom of choice and diversity raises issues of 
jury bias in regard to courtroom oaths and of political manipulation by 
religious symbols in regard to oaths of office. The Article concludes that 
while religious choice may be appropriate for the oath of office, such 
choice for the oaths of witnesses and jurors is likely to create difficulties 
that necessitate the complete removal of religious artifacts and expres-
sion from the courtroom oath. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE OATH 
Commentators have classified oaths in a variety of ways.45 In re-
gard to this Article, it will suffice to make use of two broad categories.46 
The first is the testamentary or assertatory oath, which is the oath that a 
44 See infra notes 74-107 and accompanying text. 
45 BIAcK's LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990), for example, provides definitions for the fol-
lowing categories of oath: assertatory oath, corporal oath, decisory oath, extrajudicial oath, false 
oath, judicial oath, loyalty oath or oath of allegiance, oath of office, official oath, poor debtor's 
oath, promissory oath, purgatory oath, solemn oath, suppletory oath, and voluntary oath. Many 
of these are specific to ancient judicial systems or judicial procedures that are no longer in use. 
46 The division into two general categories of oaths is common among commentators. See, 
e.g., ]AMES ENDELL TYLER, OATHS; THEIR ORIGIN, NATURE AND HISTORY 262 (London, J.W. 
Parker 1834) (quoting Puffendorf, "[llhis division of oaths into promissory and assertatory may 
comprehend [all categories] with regard to the two ends or uses now mentioned."). 4 SAMUEL 
PuFFENDORF, OF THE LAw OF NATURE AND NATIONS 352 (Basil Kennett trans., 1729); see 
also, Thomas Raeburn White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect Upon the Competency 
of Witnesses, 51 AM. L. REG. 373, 383-84 (1903); Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 
1329, 1334 (1959); Eugene L. Milhizer, So Help Me Allah: An Historical and Prudential Analysis 
of Oaths as Applied to the Current Controversy of the Bible and Quran in Oath Practices in America, 
70 OHIO ST. L.J. l, 2 (2009); MATTHEW A. PAULEY, I Do SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE PRESI-
DENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL OATH 117 (1999). 
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witness takes to guarantee the truth of the witness's testimony. The 
second is the promissory or loyalty oath, of which the oath of office and 
the oath of allegiance are types. By such an oath, a person, upon enter-
ing public office, promises to faithfully carry out the duties of that of-
fice. 47 In this type of oath, the oath-taker often pledges loyalty to a 
person, state, document, ideal, or religion. These types of oaths are sep-
arated by a functional distinction, rather than one of much substance, 
for they share an underlying similitude based on the oath-taker's com-
mitment to speak the truth: a testamentary oath is in theory a guarantee 
that what the oath-taker says will be factually truthful, while an oath of 
office guarantees that what the oath-taker does will be true to the 
office.48 
A. The judicial Oath from its Origins to Omychund v. Barker 
The oath originated as a ritual long before recorded history or es-
tablished religions.49 It operated on the basis of imitative magic, the 
belief that words and gestures could control nature and fate. 50 The pri-
meval oath-taker might have called upon some beast or natural force to 
harm or destroy her if what she said were false. Such an oath-taker may 
well have expected, along with her contemporaries, a bad fate for bad 
47 PuFFENDORF, supra note 46, at 352 ("The two principal Ends to which Oaths may be, 
and commonly are, applied, are either to strengthen and confirm a Promise by such a solemn 
Act of Religion; or to open a way to the clearing some Fact, which is at present doubtful, and 
cannot be conveniently made out any other way."). 
48 Silving, supra note 46, at 1334 ("This amorphous concept of truth constitutes the link 
between the promissory and the assenive or judicial oath."). 
49 Id. at 1330 ("The familiar oath of the present-day courtroom has been traced to a pre-
religious, indeed, pre-animistic period of our culture."). Scholars derive the evidence and under-
standing of the prehistoric oath from the practices of primitive communities today. White, 
supra note 46, at 374 ("The evidence of the customs of prehistoric times must be found largely 
in survivals of those customs, particularly among primitive tribes as they now exist."); Milhizer, 
supra note 46, at 6 ("Oaths are a virtually universal custom, which precede the type of recorded 
history that would allow for a complete analysis of their origin. The evidence of oaths among 
prehistoric cultures survives today only to the extent that the custom itself has endured, often 
through the venerable practices of primitive tribes."). 
50 Silving, supra note 46, at 1330 ("Supernatural beings were unknown, and man believed 
that he possessed magic power which could produce any desired result. A vehicle of this power 
was the curse, which could kill as effectively as physical force. It worked through the magic 
inherent in the word or the magic act. . . . The oath as self-curse continued to operate automati-
cally, by virtue of the inherent magic of word or gesture, after the onset of the animistic period 
and even after the 'discovery' of divine beings."). 
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faith. 51 With the development of the belief in divine beings, the oath 
came to depend upon the gods to act as the agents of punishment for 
the perjurer.52 The Greek Zeus and the Roman Jupiter were both 
thought to strike perjurers with lightning. 53 As Helen Silving put it, "In 
all its forms, . . . the oath remains essentially a self-curse, even when 
disguised as a blessing or an invocation of God's testimony. The curse 
'is part of the oath, as the threat of punishment is part of the law.' The 
oath, then, is in origin and essence, a conditional self-curse or 
imprecation."54 
According to the medieval English jurist, Henry Bracton (1210-
1268), jurors were sworn with the words, "So help me God and these 
hallowed things.''55 He later explains that if the judges do not know 
how to judge a case, they must have "recourse to a greater counsel.''56 
He then describes an oath "which is tendered by a party to a party in 
judgment or by a judge to a party, in which there is no conviction. For 
it is sufficient for them to wait for the vengeance of God."57 Another 
medieval jurist, John de Britton, defined the oath as "an affirmation or 
denial of anything, whereby a person is charged upon peril of his soul to 
speak the truth; and it was provided on account of people difficult of 
SI Milhizer, supra note 46, at 6 ("The ancient manner of making an oath typically involved 
an individual calling upon a beast or thing of nature (the sun, a river, etc.) to witness the truth 
of what was spoken and wreak havoc on the individual - through consumption or some other 
form of destruction - if his words were false."); White, supra note 46, at 374 ("It is said that in 
Siberia, when a member of the wild tribe of Osryaks is to be a witness, the head of a wild boar is 
brought into court. The Osryak will then imitate the actions of the boar in eating and call upon 
wild boars in general to devour him if he does not speak the truth."). 
52 Silving, supra note 46, at 1331 ("As divine beings gained significance, the curse ceased to 
exist as an independent being and gods became the tools whereby the oath was caused to 
operate."). 
53 Id. at 1330-31. 
54 Silving, supra note 46, at 1336 (quoting RUDOLF HIRZEL, DER Em, E!N BEITRAG zu 
SEINER GERSCHICHTE 139 (1902)). C£ MICHAEL GAGARIN & EIAINE FANTHAM, eds., 5 THE 
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANCIENT GREECE AND RoME 83 (2010) ("An oath is, in effect, a 
conditional self-curse .... "). See also, Milhizer, supra note 46, at 6 ("Oaths are a virtually 
universal custom, which precede the type of recorded history that would allow for a complete 
analysis of their origin .... These self-curse customs acted as a guarantor of truth insofar as the 
witness believed that a false statement would result in his imminent peril; ... "). 
55 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 21 n.88 (quoting 3 HENRY OF BRACTON, ON THE LAws AND 
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 187 (Travers Twiss trans., 1880)). 
56 Id at 21 (quoting 3 HENRY OF BRACTON, supra note 55, at 407). 
57 Id. 
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belief that oaths should be taken upon the holy Gospels of God for 
avoidance of idolatry."58 
In England, then, the oath was predicated on the idea that God 
would favor the truthful and punish the false, and was taken upon the 
Holy Scripture or other religious artifacts to indicate the source of this 
justice and the oath-taker's hope for salvation, which would be lost if 
the person lied. Because the efficacy of the oath in eliciting truth was 
based upon the oath-taker's belief in God and God's justice and the 
hope of salvation promised in the Gospels, only those who had .this 
belief and hope based on the Bible, that is, Christians, could take the 
oath to be jurors, witnesses, or government officials. The most signifi-
cant English legal authority following Bracton was Lord Edward Coke 
(1552-1634). 59 He defined the oath as an affirmation or denial by a 
Christian.60 He argued that an oath "ought to be accompanied with the 
fear of God."61 Indeed, the oath of a witness is "so sacred, as he calleth 
Almighty God (who is truth itself and cannot be deceived, and hath 
knowledge of the secrets of the heart) to witness that which he shall 
depose."62 Because the non-Christian did not believe the Christian 
promise of salvation, taking an oath on the Bible would not instill any 
fear of damnation and therefore fail to obligate such a person to tell the 
truth. Citing Bracton for the proposition that an "alien infidell" cannot 
be a witness, Coke excluded all non-Christians from taking an oath.63 
Coke also found it unacceptable for any non-Christian to take an oath 
on scriptures or by ceremonies which were not Christian because such 
58 BRITrON: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES 501 (Francis Moran Nichols trans., 
1901) (Britton describes the oath procedure: "[L]et the first juror, touching the Gospels, swear 
after this manner, 'Hear this, ye Justices, that I will speak the truth ... and I will not fail for 
anything to speak the truth, so help me God and the Saints.' Then let the Gospels be kissed 
with all reverence as our faith and salvation."), 
59 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 22 ("Although more than 350 years and many important 
developments in the law separate Bracton and Lord Edward Coke, no other writer made as 
significant or authoritative contributions to the common law as the latter."). 
Go 22 EDWARD CoKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 
164 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1809) ("An oath is an affirmation or deniall by any Christian 
of anything lawful! and honest, before one or more, that have authority to give rhe same for 
advancement of truth and right, calling Almighty God to witnesse, that his testimony is true."). 
61 EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 
278 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1809) [hereinafter COKE, THE FouRTH PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. ("Bracton saith that an alien born cannot be a witnesse: which is to be understood of 
an alien infidel."). 
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an oath would be a form of idolatry, and it would be impermissibly 
sinful for Christians to induce anyone to swear by idolatrous gods and 
false beliefs.64 The only exception to this rule, Coke notwithstanding, 
were the Jews, who were allowed to testify based on the common heri-
tage of the Old Testament they shared with Christians.65 Finally, Coke 
held that only Parliament could modify or change the ancient form of 
the oath.66 
This discrimination based on religion, odious as it may be to the 
contemporary sensibility, was the common logic and practice until the 
early modern period.67 The leaders of states insisted on religious con-
formity because they assumed they were adhering to the one true relig-
ion, and believed they were honoring God and furthering the spiritual 
well being of their subjects by forcing them to accept the religion of the 
state.68 Such leaders also thought that religious conformity was benefi-
cial to the state because it maintained political stability and social 
peace.69 The first influential rejection of these policies was A Letter Con-
64 COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 61, at 155. Coke believed 
chat if an "infidel or pagan prince may swear in the case by false gods, seeing he thereby offends 
the true God by giving divine worship co false gods," and "a Christian should any way induce 
another co swear by chem, herein he should grievously sin." Id. 
65 See White, supra note 46, at 388 & n.27 ("As a matter of fact, however, Dews) were 
admitted even before the authority of Coke's statement was finally overthrown."); Milhizer, 
supra note 46, at 22 n.92 ("Recognizing a common heritage and shared faith in the same God, 
Jews were allowed ro testify as witnesses."). White adds, "Lord Coke, who is said to have been 
an ardent hater of Catholics, even went so far as to exclude popish recusants and all excommuni-
cated persons from being witnesses." COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra 
note 46, at 388 n.28. 
66 EDWARD CoKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND, 
479 (London, E. & R. Brooke, 1797) ("A new oath cannot be imposed upon any judge, com-
missioner, or any ocher subject without authority of parliament, as here it was but the giving of 
every oath must be warranted by act of parliament, or by the common law time out of mind."). 
67 Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and SecuUirization: The Shaking Foundation 
of American Religious Liberty, 32 CARDozo L. REv. 1755, 1757-58 (2011) ("Prior to ... 'the 
Lockean revolution,' governments in the Western world tended coward regimes of coerced relig-
ion. . . . Many maintained formal religious establishments, complete with coerced religious 
conformity, taxes supporting the established religion, and compelled religious observance."). 
68 Id at 1758 ("[I]t was widely understood chat there is but one true religion, and the 
leaders of each nation-state ... believed that their own version of Christianity was chat one .... 
By insisting on religious conformity, the states themselves were honoring God by using the 
power of the state to force all citizens - and therefore the policy as a whole - ro honor God's 
will. In addition, they were furthering, paternaliscically, the individual religious well-being of 
their citizens, including dissenters, by leading chem down the one true path to religious 
salvation."). 
69 Id. ("[I)t was believed chat enforcing a common religion promoted the state's interest in 
political stability and social peace . . . . First, the religion served as a rype of social glue, unifying 
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cerning Toleration by John Locke.70 In regard to the spiritual welfare of 
those subject to the state, Locke argued that forced conversion is a 
worthless, if not counterproductive, means of saving souls. Only the 
voluntary acceptance of a religion can be efficacious for salvation.71 As 
to the stability of the state, Locke argued that it was the very persecution 
of religious dissenters that contributed to sedition and rebellion.72 For 
these and other reasons, Locke argued for a separation between the in-
terests of the church and the state in which, 
[t]he care of each man's soul and of the things of heaven, which 
neither does belong to the commonwealth nor can be subjected to it, 
is left entirely to every man's self. Thus the safeguarding of men's 
lives and of the things that belong unto this life is the business of the 
commonwealth: and the preserving of those things unto their owners 
is the duty of the magistrate. 73 
Religious tolerance would be the result of this separation, so that the 
magistrate would not exercise any power over religious practice and be-
lief that did not affect the security and safety of the state, and the church 
did not attempt to use the power of the state to impose any religious 
practice or belief on others. 
The judges who presided in the case of Omychund v. Barker, de-
cided in 17 44, reflect a great deal of the spirit and thinking of Locke's 
Letter Concerning Toleration. Omychund swept away the exclusivity of 
the Christian oath in English courts.74 The question in this case was 
society by giving citizens a uniform sense of meaning and purpose. Second, the state's promo-
tion of this religion encouraged a reciprocal, religion-based motivation for supporting and obey-
ing the governing regime."). 
70 ]OHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 33 a. Cock.in, ed., William Popple 
trans., 1796) (1689). 
71 Id. ("How great soever ... may be ... concern for the salvation of men's souls, men 
cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no. And therefore, when all is done, they 
must be left to their own consciences."). 
72 Id. at 69. "[T]here is only one thing which gathers people into seditious commotions, 
and that is oppression .... It is not diversity of opinions, ... but the refusal of toleration to 
those that are of different opinion ... that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been 
in the Christian world upon account of religion." Id. at 59. 
73 Id. at 52. 
74 Omychund v. Barker (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (KB.). See White, supra note 46, at 389 
("However the error may have arisen, it was recognized to be an error by the great case of 
Omychund v. Barker in 17 44, by which all preceding authorities were swept aside."); Milhizer, 
supra note 46, at 24 ("Omuychund v. Barker marks a major change in the common law and 
presages modern Western oath practices. Omychund set aside the extant common law practice, 
316 CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICS J [Vol. 12:303 
whether to admit the testimony of two witnesses who were members of 
the "Gentoo" or Hindu religion.75 In his opinion, Chief Justice Willes 
stated, "[I]t would be absurd for [a non-Christian] to swear according to 
the Christian oath, which he does not believe; and therefore, out of 
necessity, he must be allowed to swear according to his own notion of 
an oath."76 He held that the oath was not a uniquely Christian ritual. 
"[O]aths are as old as the creation; look into sacred history, and you will 
find a variety of instances .... "77 Furthermore, "[t]he nature of an oath 
is not at all altered by Christianity, but only made more solemn from 
the sanction of rewards and punishments being more openly de-
clared. "78 In regard to the form of the oath, Chief Baron Parker stated, 
"It is plain that by the policy of all countries, oaths are to be adminis-
tered to all persons according to their own opinions, and as it most 
affects their conscience, and laying the hand was originally borrowed 
from the pagans."79 Regarding Coke's rule, Chief Justice Willes ob-
served, "the notion [that non-Christians cannot be sworn], though ad-
vanced by so great a man, is contrary to religion, common sense, and 
endorsed by Coke, which allowed only Christian oaths sworn by Christians so that any believer 
in a superior being may be sworn on whatever oath is most binding on his conscience."). 
75 Omychund, 26 Eng. Rep. at 15 (The case arose in Calcurra. The plaintiff, Mr. 
Omychund, claimed that he had advanced Mr. Barker a sum of money for buying goods and in 
consideration was ro receive interest of 12%. Having sold the goods, Barker did not pay 
Omychund. Omychund filed a claim for a sum of 67,955 rupees, or £ 7,600. Barker left 
Calcurra and died on the voyage. The suit continued against Barker's estate. The plaintiffs two 
witnesses, Ramkissenseat and Ramchurnecooberage, were adherents of the Gentoo or Hindu 
religion. They presented their testimony as follows: "[T]he oath prescribed to be taken by the 
witnesses was interpreted to each witness respectively; after which they did severally with their 
hands touch the foot of the bramin or priest of the Gentoo religion, being also before us with 
another bramin or priest of the same religion, the oath prescribed to be taken by the witnesses 
was interpreted to him; after which Neenderam Surmah, being himself a priest, did touch the 
hand of the bramin, the same being the usual and most solemn form, in which oaths are most 
usually administered to witnesses who profess this Gentoo religion, and the same manner in 
which oaths are usually administered to such witnesses in the courts of justice, erected by letters 
patents of the late king at Calcutta."). The court uses the term "gentoo," which the OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) defines as, "A pagan inhabitant of Hindostan, opposed to 
Mohammedan; a Hindoo." 
76 Omychund, 26 Eng. Rep. at 31. 
77 Id. at 30 (As to earlier authority, Chief Justice Willes stated, "I lay no stress upon the 
authority of Bracton, Briton, and Fleta, for they lived in popish times, when no other trade was 
carried on except the trade of religion; and I hope such times will never come over again; it is 
very plain too, those ancient authorities spoke only of Christian oaths."). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 29. 
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common humanity, and I think the devils themselves, to whom he has 
delivered them, could not have suggested anything worse."80 
As a result, the court ordered "the deposition of witnesses of the 
Gentoo religion, sworn according to their ceremonies, ought upon the 
special circumstances of this case to be read as evidence in the cause."81 
The particular ceremony for taking a "Gentoo" oath was to touch the 
foot of a Brahmin or a priest while testifying. 82 The Omychund decision 
led to the frequent recitation, in later court opinions and handbooks on 
evidence, of a list of religious ceremonies by which non-Christians could 
take an oath. The following is typical: "A Jew may be sworn on the 
Pentateuch or Old Testament, with his head covered, a Mohammedan 
on the Koran, a Gentoo, touching with his hand the foot of a Brahmin 
or priest of his religion, a Chinese, by breaking a china saucer."83 How-
ever, the court's liberality did not extend to nonbelievers, as the 
Omychund court found that "such infidels (if any such there be) who 
either do not believe in a God, or if they do do not think that He will 
either reward or punish them in this world or in the next, cannot be 
witnesses."84 The exception reflected a limitation that Locke favored as 
80 Id. at 30. 
81 Id. at 15. 
82 See supra note 75. 
83 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 60 (quoting United States v. Miller, 236 F. 798, 799-800 
(W.D. Wa. 1916). Compare other early examples: "But to this, it has been answered ... that 
other legal proof, is put in opposition to solemn affirmation ... whether administered upon the 
Gospels to a Christian, or upon the Pentateuch to a Jew; whether with the solemnity of an 
uplifted hand, according to some sectaries; or with the ceremonial of the hand placed beneath 
the thigh, as it is practiced by the Gentoo nations." Lewis v. Maris, 1 U.S. 278, 288 (1788). 
"By the law of England, which has been adopted in this state, it is fully and clearly settled, that 
.... Mahometans may be sworn on the Koran; fews on the Pentateuch, and Gentoos and others, 
according to the ceremonies of their religion, whatever may be the form. It is appealing to God 
to witness what we say, and invoking punishment, if what we say be false. (Willes's Rep. 549. 1 
Atk. 45. Str. 1104. Morgan's case, Leach's Cr. C. 64.)." Jackson, ex dem. Tuttle v. Gridley, 18 
Johns. 98 (N.Y. Sup. 1820). See also Wellborn v. Younger, 3 Hawks 205, 1824 WL 346, at *2 
(N.C. 1824); Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66, 1828 WL 50, at *3 (Conn. 1828); and Harvey v. 
Boies, 1 Pen. & W. 12, 1829 WL 2642 at *2 (Pa. 1829). 
84 White, supra note 46, at 391 (quoting AoJUDGED CAsES JN THE COURT OF COMMON 
PLEAS DuruNG THE TIME OF LoRD CHIEF JusTJCE WILLES 549 (1802)). The version in the 
English Reports is slightly different. "Though I have shown that an Infidel in general cannot be 
excluded from being a witness, and though I am of opinion that infidels who believe a God, and 
future rewards and punishments in the other world, may be witnesses; yet I am as clearly of 
opinion, that if they do not believe a God, or future rewards and punishments, they ought not 
to be admitted as witnesses." Omychund, 26 Eng. Rep. at 31. The Repon from Adjudged Cases 
quoted by White makes it clear that belief in punishment during life or after death is immaterial, 
while the English Report does not. 
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well. "[T]hose are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of 
God."85 Indeed, Locke considered the oath to be essential to civil soci-
ety, and the inability of the atheist to take an oath for lack of belief in 
God was a major reason for Locke's intolerance. "Promises, covenants, 
and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold 
upon an atheist. The taking away of god, though but even in thought, 
dissolves all."86 Another reason Locke did not favor the toleration of 
non-religion was that he regarded it as corrosive to religion. "[T]hose 
that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no 
pretense of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a tolera-
tion. "87 Thus, after Omychund, the common law still considered athe-
ists incompetent to testify because their guarantee of truthfulness was 
not supported by a belief in a higher power that would punish them if 
they testified falsely. 
B. Conscientious Objections to the Oath to the American Constitution 
In a separate development that was later to resolve this issue for 
atheists, the rise of the Quakers, or the Society of Friends, in the mid-
seventeenth century presented a distinct problem for English jurispru-
dence.88 Quakers believed it was sinful to swear an oath because of its 
obligatory invocation of the name of God and self-curse.89 Because they 
refused to swear an oath, English courts barred Quakers from giving 
testimony or being jurors, even fining them, despite their reputation for 
85 LocKE, supra note 70, at 56. 
86 Id 
87 Id 
88 George Fox (1624-1691) is credited as the chief founder of the Society of Friends, or 
Quakers. AI; a young man he traveled around the midlands speaking with ministers and priests, 
and eventually acquired the vision of a more genuine Christian practice through "openings" or 
insights into the Bible which he experienced in 1646-47. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra 
note 18, at, 3180-81, s.v. Fox, George (2005). See also GEORGE Fox, THE JOURNAL OF 
GEORGE Fox (Cambridge 1911). 
89 On the Quaker objection to oaths, see HUGH BARBOUR & U.J. WILLIAM FROST, THE 
QUAKERS 41-42 (1988). The early Christians were reluctant to swear because of the apparent 
prohibition against swearing in Matthew 5:33-37. "Again, ye have heard that it hath been said 
by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine 
oaths: But I say unto you, Swear not at all; neither by heaven; for it is God's throne: Nor by the 
eanh; for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King. Neither 
shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your 
communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." Mat-
thew 5:33-37 (King James). See also James 5:12 (King James) ("But above all things, my breth-
ren, swear not, neither by heaven, neither by the eanh, neither by any other oath: but let your 
yea be yea; and your nay, nay; lest ye fall into condemnation."). 
2014] "SO HELP ME?" 319 
honesty.90 In 1688, Parliament passed a statute providing some relief by 
allowing Quakers to substitute a "declaration of fidelity" for the oath of 
allegiance to the British government.91 In 1696, Parliament passed an-
other statute that allowed Quakers to testify in court by affirmation in 
certain cases.92 This form of affirmation was not completely acceptable 
to the Quakers because it still contained a reference to God.9~ Parlia-
ment again acted and in 1721 revised both the oath of loyalty and the 
judicial oath to be taken by Quakers.94 Later acts of Parliament ex-
tended the affirmation to Moravians and Separatists and to persons of 
any denomination who claimed to have a conscientious objection to the 
oath.95 Finally, in 1888, British law extended permission to testify upon 
affirmation to atheists.96 
The laws of Great Britain were brought to the colonies and en-
forced there as well.97 Because of its Quaker founding, the colony of 
90 White, supra note 46, at 420 & n.85; Milhizer, supra note 46, at 37-38. 
91 White, supra note 46, at 420; Milhizer, supra note 30, at 38; 1 W. & M., c. 18 (1688) 
(Eng.). 
92 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 34 (1696) (Eng.) ("I, A.B., do declare in the presence of Almighty God 
the Wimesse of the Truth of what I say."); White, supra note 46, at 421; Milhizer, supra note 
46, at 38. 
93 White, supra note 46, at 421. 
94 8 Geo. 2, c. 6 (1721) (Eng.) ("I, A.B. do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and 
affirm.") 
95 12 Geo. 2, c. 13 (1739) (Eng.) (permitting Quakers to be admitted as attorneys or solici-
tors upon affirmation rather than oath); 22 Geo. 2, c. 46 (1749) (Eng.) (extending affirmation 
of Quakers to all circumstances requiring an oath); 9 Geo. 4, c. 32 (1828) (Eng.) (extending the 
right to affirm in civil and criminal cases to Moravians as well as Quakers); 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 49 
(1833) (Eng.) (extending the right of affirmation to Quakers and Moravians in all instances 
where an oath is required); 1 & 2 Viet., c. 77 (1838) (Eng.) (permitting former Quakers and 
Moravians to affirm); 6 & 7 Viet., c 22 (1843) (Eng.) (allowing colonial legislation permitting 
admissibility of testimony by non-Christian inhabitants); 17 & 18 Viet., c.125 (1854) (Eng.) 
(permitting anyone who has a religious objection to taking an oath, to affirm instead with the 
words, "I, A.B. do solemnly, sincerely, and truly affirm and declare, That the taking of any Oath 
is according to my religious Belief, unlawful, and I do also solemnly, sincerely, and truly affirm 
and declare etc."); 32 & 33 Viet., c. 68 (1869) (Eng.) (permitting any person called to give 
evidence in any court of justice to state under penalty of perjury, "I promise and declare that the 
evidence given by me to the court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth."). 
96 51 & 52 Viet., c. 46 (1888) (Eng.) (extending the right of affirmation to anyone with a 
conscientious objection, including atheists: "Every person upon objecting to being sworn, and 
stating, as the ground of such objection, either that he has no religious belief, or that the taking 
of an oath is contrary to his religious belief, shall be permitted to make his solemn affirmation 
instead of taking an oath in all places and for all purposes where an oath is or shall be required 
by law."). 
97 White, supra note 46, at 422; Milhizer, supra note 46, at 38. 
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Pennsylvania had an interest in modifying the form of the oath, and, 
indeed, in 1682, William Penn and his followers agreed to a statute 
requiring that testimony be given in court by affirmation alone, and not 
oath, without any religious reference at all. 98 
All witnesses, coming or called to testify their knowledge in or to any 
matter or thing in court, or before any lawful authority within the said 
province, shall there give or deliver in their evidence or testimony, by 
solemnly promising to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, to the matter or thing in question. 99 
In 1903, White characterized this law to be "far in advance of any En-
glish law of that day and indeed of this day." 100 Perhaps that statement 
still holds. The British Parliament repealed the colonial law in 1693, 
only to replace it with the Act of 1696, for Quakers in both Britain and 
America. 101 
From Omychund the colonies inherited as common law the rule 
that non-Christians may take oaths according to the ceremonies of their 
respective religions. 102 American courts followed this rule. 103 Presuma-
bly, late colonial and early state courts would apply that rule, as in Lewis 
v. Maris, decided in 1788. 
But to this, it has been answered ... that other legal proof, is put in 
opposition to solemn affirmation, ... whether administered upon the 
Gospels to a Christian, or upon the Pentateuch to a Jew; whether with 
98 White, supra note 46, at 422; Miilhizer, supra note 46, at 38. 
99 White, supra note 46, at 422 (quoting 1 MINUTES OF THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 40 (1852)). 
100 The statute continues, "And in case any person so called to evidence shall be convicted of 
willful falsehood, such person shall suffer and undergo such damage or penalty, as the person or 
persons against whom he or she bore false witness, did or should undergo; and shall also make 
satisfaction to the party wronged, and be publicly exposed as a false witness, never to be credited 
in any court, or before any magistrate, in the said province." 1 MINUTES OF THE PROVINCIAL 
COUNCIL, supra note 99, at 40. 
101 White supra note 46, at 422; Milhizer, supra note 46, at 38. 
102 White, supra note 46, at 422-23; Milhizer, supra note 46, at 38. 
103 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 27 & n.112 (citing, among others, Herbert Pope, the English 
Common Law in the United States, 24 HARv. L. REv. 6, passim (1910) (finding that the English 
common law was persuasive rather than mandatory authority in the colonies); and Harlan 
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 10-13 (1936)) ("(T]he 
common law practice of allowing a witness to be sworn by whatever means were most binding 
on his conscience would be brought to the New World .... English common law was the law of 
colonial America."). 
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the solemnity of an uplifted hand, according to some sectaries; or with 
the ceremonial of the hand placed beneath the thigh, as it is practiced 
by the Gentoo nations. 104 
321 
By the time of the Declaration of Independence, most of the colonies 
also had provided for the right of Quakers and other religious dissenters 
to affirm rather than take an oath by statute. 105 However, statutes al-
lowing affirmation were strictly construed so as to apply to the members 
of the religious sects specifically accommodated by law and no others. 
Thus, a person who had a conscientious objection to the oath but who 
did not belong to a religious denomination exempt by statute from tak-
ing the oath was not allowed to provide testimony by affirmation. 106 A1; 
for an avowed atheist, the Omychund case made it clear that the right to 
take an oath in accordance with the ceremonies of one's religion did not 
allow nonbelievers to testify since they had no religion. 107 In any event, 
even before the founding of the United States, the common law allowed 
non-Christians to swear by their equivalent religious ceremonies in a 
judicial proceeding and allowed Christians with conscientious objec-
tions to the oath to affirm. The issue of the loyalty oath, however, was 
not as clear. 
104 Lewis v. Maris, 1 U.S. 278, 288 (1788). See also other opinions cited, supra note 83; and 
infra notes 189-203 and accompanying text concerning the arguments of Charles Iredell. 
10s White, supra note 46, at 423 ("At the time of the Declaration of Independence the law in 
England allowed only 'Quakers' to affirm ... in brief, the thirteen original colonies provided for 
the affirmation of Quakers; some included Dunkers and Mennonites, and a few all persons 
having religious scruples against swearing. Some had no express provision, but in their absence 
the law would stand as it was before the Declaration of independence, i.e. Quakers only could 
affirm."). 
106 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 39 n.163, cites cases: In re Mclntire's Case, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 
157 (1803) (affirmation by a juror not a Quaker, and not attached to any particular religious 
sect, was not permitted); In re Bryan's Case, 1 D.C (1Cranch)151 (1804) (juror not allowed to 
make affirmation in lieu of oath, on the ground that he was a Methodist, where it was not 
contrary to the principles of chat religious sociery to cake an oath); King v. Fearson, 3 D.C. (3 
Cranch) 435 (1829) (affirmation instead of oath permitted where the witness had applied for 
admission to full participation in the membership of the society of Quakers, and usually met 
with them for worship). See also Scott v. Hooper, 14 Ve. 535, 537-38 (1842) ("Nor does the 
case of Quakers, or persons admitted by statute to testify under affirmation have any bearing on 
the question submitted. They are admitted by statute. And, moreover, che pains and penalties 
of perjury comprised in the oath of affirmation are not limited to the statute punishment, but 
extend to divine punishment denounced against bearing false witness .... le having been proved 
chat the witness, several months before the trial, repeatedly and seriously declared his disbelief in 
the existence of a God, his recantation, at the time and under the circumstances detailed in the 
bill of exceptions, did not restore his competency."). 
107 See supra notes 84, 106 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE ENGLISH OATHS OF LOYALTY 
The peculiar history of the loyalty oath in Great Britain was to 
have a very specific influence on the Constitution of the United States. 
With the rise of the modern British state, the English monarch, and 
later Parliament, attempted to exact greater control over the people than 
the old feudal system provided. In 1534, Henry VIII modified the Cor-
onation Oath to make obedience to the King unconditional, 108 and re-
placed the feudal oath of allegiance with the Oath of Succession and the 
Oath of Supremacy, both of which had the effect of renouncing the 
religious authority of the Pope and of making the King of England the 
head of the Church in England. 109 His successors followed this exam-
ple. Elizabeth enacted another Oath of Supremacy of 1559.11° James I 
provided for the Oath of Allegiance of 1606.111 Parliament later at-
tempted to arrogate allegiance to itself with A Solemn League and Cove-
nant of 1643112 and A Sacred Vow and Covenant of 1645. 113 During 
the Protectorate, Parliament claimed allegiance by means of the Engage-
ment of 1649, and then Oliver Cromwell did likewise through the Pro-
tectorate Oath of 1654. 114 During the Restoration, Charles II 
reinstituted the Oaths of Succession and Supremacy and added other 
oaths from 1661 to 1665.115 When the Glorious Revolution ousted 
King Jam es II, Parliament placed William and Mary on the throne, and 
108 Supremacy of the Crown Act 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.). By "[n]egating the element of 
popular consent in the coronation oath," Tudor officials conveyed "to subjects that the monarch 
owed his appointment directly to God and that he exercised an authority for which he was 
accountable to God alone." DAVID MARTIN JoNES, CONSCIENCE AND ALLEGIANCE IN SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND: THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF OATHS 26 (1999). See also 
EDWARD v ALLANCE, REVOLUTIONARY ENGLAND AND THE NATIONAL COVENANT (2005); and 
CoNAL CONDREN, ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (2001). 
I09 JONES, supra note 108, at 30-31 (the Oath of Succession, "implicitly renounced the spiri-
tual supremacy of the Pope," and the Oath of Supremacy accepted "the King's majesty as the 
only supreme head in earth of die Church of England."). 
110 Id. at 48, 271-72 (widi mis oath Queen Elizabeth continued Henry VIII's effort to ex-
tract recognition that the English monarch was the head of the Church of England). 
111 Id. at 44, 272-73 (with this oath, James I attempted to separate politically disloyal 
Catholics from those who accepted the Protestant monarchy). 
1 12 Id. at 125, 275-78 (this oath attempted to impose reforms on the Church of England 
modeled on Scottish Presbyterianism in order to bring the Scots into the Civil War on die side 
of Parliament). 
11 3 Id. at 27 4-75 (by this oath Parliament attempted to exact allegiance to itself rather than to 
the King). 
11 4 Id. at 278-79. 
11 5 Id. at 279-80 (these oaths indicated there were no circumstances under which subjects 
could lawfully resist the King). 
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enacted oaths to secure allegiance to them. 116 Thus, English subjects 
were successively required to take oaths of loyalty to the King, then to 
Parliament, then to the dictator Cromwell, then to the King again, and 
then to Parliament's choice for King and Queen. At various times, vir-
tually anyone could be required to take the oaths, and the punishment 
for refusal ranged from fines, to exclusion from public office, to confis-
cation of property, to the death penalty for high treason in the event of 
a second refusal.11 7 
The English colonists who settled in America had to take the same 
oaths. 118 In 1634, Massachusetts developed a loyalty oath to the colony 
that the English government suppressed in 1684. 119 At the outset of the 
American Revolution, every one of the colonies developed its own loy-
alty oath. 120 As the war went on, the British military authorities de-
manded that Americans living in areas occupied by the British take 
oaths to the crown, while the American military authorities demanded 
oaths supporting the revolutionary forces. 121 
Many British oaths included explicit religious statements, which 
made it difficult, if not impossible, for Catholics, Jews, and minority 
Protestant sects to take the oaths for public office. These were religious 
tests. For example, the Oath of Supremacy, instituted by Elizabeth I, 
required the oath-taker to swear that the Queen was "the only supreme 
governor of this realm . . . in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or 
causes, and that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate 
116 Id. at 280-81 (these oaths directed loyalty to William and Mary, who were not in the line 
of succession, but rather were chosen by Parliament upon the forced abdication of James II). 
117 ]ONES, supra note 108, at 270-71. Sir Thomas More was executed for treason in 1539 
because he refused to take the Oath of Supremacy. 4 THE NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
supra note 30, at 890. 
l 18 HAROLD M. HYMAN, To TRY MEN's SouLS: LOYALlY TESTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 11 
(1959) ("[W]hether as members of the initial commercial organization of the Anglican Virginia 
colony or under its later royal control, as participants in the search for an independent theocracy 
which the Calvinist Puritans pursued in New England, or as adventurers in the Catholic proprie-
tary colony of Maryland, new Americans carried their heritage of England's loyalty problems 
with them."). 
119 Id. at 40-46. 
120 Id. at 85 ("Each state had, by 1778, created a loyalty test for all its residents to swear."). 
121 Id. at 74-75, 78 (Hyman relates how, in late 1775 to 1776, "George Washington and the 
Continental Army entered the loyalty-testing business" and "launched loyalty-testing expedi-
tions into the heavily Tory and strategically important Rhode Island and Long Island areas." A 
year later, "General Howe's redcoats flooded across Long Island, New York City, and New Jersey 
. . . . In the areas abandoned in the face of British might, thousands of civilians, firmly sworn to 
Whig allegiance, welcomed the royal forces with no apparent taint of conscience."). 
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hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence 
or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm." 122 The Oath of 
Abjuration that Parliament passed during the Interregnum, required the 
oath-taker to renounce Catholic doctrines, such as Transubstantiation, 
the existence of Purgatory, and Salvation by Works. 123 The Corporation 
Act of 1661 and legislation amending it passed in 1673 and 1678 re-
quired members of both the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords and anyone who was to fill any other civil or military office to 
receive the sacrament of communion of the Church of England within a 
year of election or appointment. 124 This excluded religious minorities 
from government office, Parliament most notably. 125 
In 1716, Thomas Bede, writing on the history of oaths in Great 
Britain, stated that certainly "no nation in the world has invented more 
variety of oath."126 John Selden facetiously commented in 1686: 
"Oaths are so frequent, they should be taken like Pills, swallowed whole; 
122 Act of Supremacy, 1558, 1 Eliz. l, c. l, § 9 (Eng.) (this oath was to be taken by "clergy, 
justices, mayors and other lay officers). See also Act of Supremacy, 1562, 5 Eliz. 1 (Eng.) (im-
posing a revised version of the oath on "all persons in Holy Orders, university graduates, school-
masters, lawyers, and court officials, and all future Members of the House of Commons."); 
CHRIS SEAR, HousE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, THE PARLIAMENTARY OATH 16 (Dec. 14, 2001), 
available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RPOl-116 (the first Oath of Supremacy 
was instituted by Henty VIII, "essentially as a political weapon against Roman Catholics."). 
The 1609 Oath of Allegiance under James I stated, "[a]nd I do further swear that I do from my 
heart abhor, detest, and abjure, as impious and heretical this damnable doctrine and position,-
that princes whicli be excommunicated by the pope may be deposed or murdered by their 
subjects or by any other whatsoever." Popish Recusants' Act 1605, 3 Jae. l, c. 4 (Eng.). See also 
Oath of Allegiance Act 1609, 7 Jae. l, c. 6 (Eng.). 
123 An Ordinance for Explanation of a Former Ordinance for Sequestration of Delinquents 
Estates with Some Enlargements, August, 1643, in Acrs AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREG-
NUM, 1642 - 1660 (C.H. Firth & R.S. Rait eds., 1911), available at http://www.british-his-
tory.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55851 ("I ... Do abjure and renounce the Pope's Supremacy 
and Authority over the Catholic Church in General, and over myself in Particular; And I do 
believe that there is not any Transubstantiation in the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, or in the 
Elements of Bread and Wine afrer Consecration thereof, by any Person whatsoever; And I do 
also believe, that there is not any Purgatory, Or that the consecrated Host, Crucifixes, or Images, 
ought to be worshipped, or that any worship is due unto any of them; And I also believe that 
Salvation cannot be Merited by Works, and all Doctrines in affirmation of the said Points; I do 
abjure and renounce, without any Equivocation, Mental Reservation, or secret Evasion whatso-
ever, taking the words by me spoken, according to the common and usual meaning of them. So 
help me God."). 
124 Corporation Act 1661, 13 Car. 2, c. 1 (Eng.); First Test Act, 1673, 25 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.); 
Second Test Act, 1678, 30 Car. 2, c. 1 (Eng.). 
125 SEAR, supra note 122, at 18. 
126 ]ONES, supra note 108, at 11 (quoting T. BEADE, THE HISTORY OF PUBLICK AND SOL-
EMN STATE OATHS FROM THE CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME 6 (1716)). 
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if you chew them you will find them bitter; if you think what you swear, 
'twill hardly go down." 127 The readiness and frequency with which the 
British government imposed contradictory oaths forced subjects to be-
tray religious beliefs, political loyalties, and, of course, previous oaths. 
This could not but only result in cynicism and contempt. In 1662, an 
Anglican declared that Quakers had been: 
Scared from all Swearing by the frequent forfeited Oaths and re-
peated perjuries of those Times, in which the cruel Ambitions and 
disorderly Spirits of some men, like the Demoniacal in the Gospel 
brake all bonds of lawful Oaths, by which they were bound to God 
and the king; daily imposing, as any new Partie or Interest prevailed 
the Superfoetations of new and illegal Oaths, monstrous vows, fac-
tious Covenants, desperate Engagements, and damnable 
Abjurations. 128 
This was the legacy that the American colonists received, many of whom 
were religious dissenters themselves. 129 The result was the No Religious 
Test Clause of the Constitution. 
127 CONDREN, supra note 108, at 233 (quoting JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 95 (1786) 
(1686)) 
128 v ALLANCE, supra note 108, at 153-54 (quoting JOHN GAUD EN, A DISCOURSE CONCERN-
ING PUBLICK 0ATHES, AND THE LAWFULNESS OF SWEARING IN JumclAL PROCEEDINGS 8 
(1662)). The satirist, Samuel Buder (1612-1680) wrote: 
As soon as a Man hath taken an oath against his Conscience and done his Endeavour 
to damn himself, He is capable of any Trust or Employment in the Government. So 
excellent a Quality is Perjury to render the most perfidious of men most fit and proper 
for publick Charges of the greatest Consequence ... and this is the Modern Way of 
Test as they call it - to take measure of Men's abilities and Faith by their Alacrity in 
Swearing - And is indeed the most compendious way to exclude all those that have 
any conscience, and to take in such as have none at all. 
SAMUEL BUTLER, PROSE OBSERVATIONS 6 (H. McQuehen, ed., 1979). Cf ]ONES, supra note 
108, at 147 (citing Algernon Sydney's comment that the Engagement Oath was likely "to prove 
a snare to every honest man whilst every knave would slip through it."). JOHN LILBOURNE, 
RAsH OATHS UNWARRANTABLE (1647): 
Oaths ... now are nothing but cloaks of knavery, and breeders of strife and mischief. 
Therefore for shame lay them all down and press them no more upon any man what-
soever, for he that conscientiously makes nothing of an oath, will make as little of 
breaking his oath, whensoever it shall make for his profit, ease, or preferment, whereas 
to him that conscientiously scruples an oath, his bare word ... is the sincerest tie in 
the world. 
129 The religious tests for serving in Parliament were gradually removed during the course of 
the nineteenth century. In 1829, Catholics could take an oath that omitted denial of Catholic 
doctrines and they could therefore serve in Parliament. Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1829, 10 
Geo. 4, c. 7, § 2 (Eng.), In 1833, Quakers were similarly allowed to omit "So Help me God," 
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III. THE No R.EuG1ous TEST CLAUSE 
A. The States at the Time of the Founding 
Article VI of the Constitution states, "no religious Test shall ever 
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the 
United States." This was, in fact, the only religious clause in the un-
amended draft of the Constitution. 130 The No Religious Test Clause, 
however, originally referred only to offices in the federal government. 
Much like the Establishment Clause, which, by a strict literal reading, 
prohibited only the federal government from establishing a religion, the 
No Religious Test Clause prohibited only the federal government, and 
not the states, from imposing a religious test. 131 Unlike the Establish-
ment Clause, however, the Supreme Court has never applied the No 
Religious Test Clause to the states through the Fourteenth 
Arnendment. 132 
opening service in Parliament to them as well. Quakers and Moravians Act 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, 
c. 4 (1835) (Eng.). The House Lords in 1858 agreed to a Bill permitting Jews to rake a modi-
fied version of the Oath of Abjuration without the words, "on the true faith of a Christian,. 
Oaths of Allegiance etc. and Relief of the Jews Act 1858, 21 & 22 Viet., c. 48 (Eng.), 
130 Winston E. Calvert, Note, judicial Selection and the Religious Test Clause, 82 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1129, 1145 (2004). 
131 See Notes, An OriginalistAnalysis of the No Religious Test Clause, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1649, 
1660-61 (2007) [hereinafter Originalist Ana(ysis] ("Although judicial interpretations of the No 
Religious Test Clause are scarce, history makes clear what the Founders understood the clause to 
prohibit: a test forcing individuals seeking certain positions in the federal government to bind 
themselves through an oath or affirmation to a particular religious belief or sacrament in order to 
be qualified to hold office. The placement of the clause in Article VI, immediately after the 
Oath Clause - and connected by the conjunction 'but' - confirms this understanding, as do the 
ratification debates."); Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of 
Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 674, 693 (1996-
97) ("The deep discontinuity between the Framers' convictions, as revealed in their shaping of 
state regimes, and the federal church-state order is confirmed by the wording of Article VI itself. 
It subjects all officers - state and federal - to the oath requirement, but only federal officers to 
the test ban."). 
l32 Originalist Analysis, supra note 131, at 1660 ("Judicial interpretations of the No Religious 
Test Clause are virtually nonexistent."); Bradley, supra note 131, at 714 ("Article VI, section 3 
itself has never itself been 'incorporated' or otherwise declared applicable to the states. [S]ave for 
one holding, ... that a particular oath was not a religious test, no judicial decision has rested 
upon the clause, and so there is no judicial littering upon this seemingly pristine landscape."). 
See also Originalist Analysis, supra note 131, at 1660 ("The closest any federal court has come to 
deciding a case under the No Religious Test Clause was in Torcaso v. Watkim."); Torcaso v. 
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961) (The Court noted that the plaintiff charged that Maryland 
was violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. But the Court then 
stated, "Appellant also claimed that the State's test oath requirement violates the provision of 
Art. VI of the Federal Constitution . . . . Because we are reversing the judgment on other 
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Despite the Establishment Clause's ban of federal religious estab-
lishment, the following states maintained religious establishments, some 
of which endured long after the state had ratified the Constitution: 
North Carolina, until 1776; New York, until 1777; Virginia, until 
1785; South Carolina, until 1790; Georgia, until 1798; Maryland, until 
1810; Connecticut, until 1818; New Hampshire, until 1819; and Mas-
sachusetts, until 1833.133 It should not be surprising, then, that during 
the early years of the Union, the states had religious requirements for 
state office. In fact, all of them had either direct or indirect religious 
tests. 134 
A 1784 Connecticut Statute denied public office to anyone who 
believed "there are more Gods than one," or who denied "the Being of 
God," that "any One of the Persons in the Holy Trinity to be God," or 
that "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be of Di-
vine Authority." 135 The Connecticut Constitution of 1818, Article 10, 
Section l, obliged officeholders to utter, "So help me God," in the oath 
of office. 136 According to Delaware's Constitution of 177 6, Article 22, 
all members of the legislature or any office of trust had to declare, "I, A 
B, do profess faith in God, the Father, and in Jesus Christ his only Son, 
and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore; and I do ac-
knowledge the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be 
given by divine inspiration." 137 
Georgia's 1777 Constitution, Article VI provided that state offi-
cials "shall be of the Protestant religion." 138 Maryland's 1776 Constitu-
tion, Article L V, required an office holder to "subscribe a declaration of 
his belief in the Christian religion." 139 The Massachusetts Constitution 
of 1780, Article I, required the declaration, "I, A. B., do declare, that I 
grounds, we find it unnecessary to consider appellant's contention chat chis provision applies co 
state as well as federal officers." The Court then proceeded to find the Maryland requirement 
violative of the religious clauses of the First Amendment.). 
133 STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 17 (2d ed. 2006). 
134 Calvert, supra note 130, at 1146 ("Early state constitutions mimicked the breadth of the 
European tests: thirteen states with religious tests limited public office on the basis of denomina-
tion or theology."). 
135 THE FIRST LAws OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 67 Oohn D. Cushing ed., 1982). 
136 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER OR-
GANIC LAws OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 546 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. 
137 lid. at 566. 
138 2 id. at 779. 
139 3 id. at 1700. 
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believe the Christian religion, and have a firm persuasion of its truth." 140 
The New Hampshire Constitutions of 1784 and 1792 required repre-
sentatives and the chief executive, or president, to be "of the Protestant 
religion." 141 New Jersey's Constitution of 1776, Article XIX, provided, 
"all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect, ... 
shall be capable of being elected into any office of profit or trust, or 
being a member of either branch of the Legislature."142 Article 52 of 
the New York State Constitution of 1777 allowed the state legislature 
discretion to naturalize only those persons who "abjure and renounce all 
allegiance and subjection to all and every foreign king, prince, potentate, 
and State in all matters, ecclesiastical as well as civil," clearly an effort to 
exclude Catholics. 143 
North Carolina's Constitution of 1776, Part XXXII, provided 
"[t]hat no person, who shall deny the being of God, or the Truth of the 
Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old or New 
Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with the 
freedom and safety of the State, shall be capable of holding any office or 
place of trust or profit in the civil department within this State."144 In 
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Article XVI, Section 10, an of-
fice holder had to declare, "I do believe in one God, the creator and 
governor of the universe, the rewarder of the good, and the punisher of 
the wicked. And I do acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New 
Testament to be given by Divine inspiration."145 The Constitution of 
South Carolina of 1778, Articles III, XII, and XIII, required the gover-
nor, lieutenant governor, members of the privy council, senators, and 
representatives to be of the Protestant religion. 146 Vermont's 1777 Con-
stitution Chapter II, Section XII, required members of the House of 
Representatives to make the same declaration already quoted for Penn-
sylvania, with the additional words, "and own and profess the Protestant 
religion." 147 Until 1786, a non-Christian in Virginia would have to 
140 3 id. at 1908. 
141 4 id. at 2460-63. 
142 5 id. at 2597-98. 
143 5 id. at 2637-38. 
144 5 id. at 2793. 
145 5 id. at 3085. 
146 6 id. at 3249-52. 
147 6 id. at 3757. 
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keep his religious opinions to himself because of a statute that made it a 
criminal offence to publically utter a non-Christian view. 148 
Only Rhode Island did not impose a religious test for public office. 
Its first Constitution, which was ratified in 1842, Article I, Section 3, 
stated, "[N]o man shall be ... disqualified from holding any office; nor 
otherwise suffer from holding any religious belief." 149 However, the 
same Constitution still required office holders to swear with, "So help 
me God." 150 
The limitation upon religious freedom represented by these relig-
ious tests was not lost on the few non-Christians who lived in the colo-
nies. Near the end of the Constitutional Convention, Jonas Phillips, a 
Jew who resided in Philadelphia, raised the issue of the religious test in a 
letter dated September 7, 1787, addressed to the President and members 
of the Convention. 151 Phillips quoted the religious test oath in the 
Constitution of Pennsylvania requiring an acknowledgement that the 
New Testament was divinely inspired, and argued, "to swear and believe 
that the new testement was given by devine inspiration is absolutly 
against the religious principle of a Jew, and is against his Conscience to 
take any such oath - By the above law a Jew is deprived of holding any 
publick office or place of Government."152 
The backdrop of religious test oaths, which flourished in Great 
Britain and the incipient states, indicates the remarkable novelty of the 
148 "Virginia was uniquely tolerant, setting up no doctrinal obstacle either by the Constitu-
tion of 1776 or by subsequent statutes. There is no doubt that had a professed atheist, polythe-
ist, or unorthodox Christian (like a Unitarian) been elected, he had a legal right ro the pose. But 
he would have had ro serve from jail, because both by common law and statute Virginia 
criminalized at least rhe public utterance of such views." Bradley, supra note 131, ar 683 (citing 
Rhys Isaac, Evangelical Revolt: The Nature of the Baptists' Challenge to the Traditional Order in 
Virginia 1765-1775, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 345 (1974)). 
149 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS, supra note 136, ar 3223. 
150 6 id. ar 3231-32. 
ISi Originalist Analysis, supra note 131, ar 1653. (citing Letter from Jonas Phillips ro Presi-
dent and members of the Convention (Sept. 7, 1787) in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 
638 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)). 
1s2 Id. See also A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth, or 
Scare of Pennsylvania, in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS, supra note 136, ac 3082 
(Phillips goes on ro note char the religious rest contradicts Article II of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution. He funhermore recalls the suppon char Jews gave ro the Revolutionary effon, and ex-
presses his own prayers "char rhe people of these States Rise up as a great young Lion" and that 
"the almighty God of our father Abraham Isaac and Jacob endue this Noble Assembly wirh 
wisdom Judgement and unarnity in their Councells."). Cf Petition of rhe Philadelphia Syna-
gogue ro Council of Censors of Pennsylvania (Dec. 23, 1783), in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITU-
TION an. 6, cl. 3, no. 6 
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prohibition against religious tests, which the drafters of the Constitution 
proposed. The subsequent controversy regarding this ban that occurred 
in the individual state ratifying conventions further revealed the vision 
and innovation of this decision. 
B. The State Constitutional Ratifying Debates 
In 1996, Steven B. Epstein published an article in the Columbia 
Law Review entitled, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial De-
ism.153 He began by imagining the United States in the year 2096, 
which, because of "radically altered immigration and birth patterns" 
now possesses a population which is seventy percent Muslim and only 
twenty-five percent Christian and Jewish. 154 In this future country, 
school children recite a version of the Pledge of Allegiance containing 
the phrase one nation "under Allah." 155 The national currency possesses 
the newly coined motto of, "In Allah we trust." 156 Government officials 
take their oaths of office on the Qur' an and utter, "So help me Al-
lah." 157 Epstein's purpose in presenting this scenario was to demon-
strate the exclusionary effect of a "ceremonial deism" that privileged 
Muslim rather than Christian religious expression. 158 Whatever force 
this introduction may have lent his thesis about the unconstitutionality 
of ceremonial deism would not have been lost on the state representa-
tives who debated ratification of the Constitution with its prohibition 
on religious tests. That is because more than two hundred years ago 
these representatives contemplated a very similar scenario in which the 
Protestant population of the country would be overwhelmed by the ad-
herents of other religions who could impose their religious beliefs and 
ceremonies on the rest. 
153 Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Comtitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 CowM. L. 
REv. 2083 (1996). 
154 Id at 2084. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id at 2085. 
158 Id at 2086 ("In sponsoring the practices described in the opening paragraph, is the gov-
ernment not conveying a message that religion generally, and the Islamic religion in particular, is 
favored or preferred? Would the average Christian or Jew seriously contend that this America of 
2096 would not make them feel like outsiders in their own country? How then can Christians 
and Jews reconcile this feeling of exclusion with approval of a state of affairs in 1996 in whicli 
non-Christians, non-Jews, and nonreligionists have no constitutional basis for attacking 'cere-
monial' Christian or Judea-Christian forms of government expression?"). 
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The No Religious Test Clause received little discussion at the Con-
stitutional Convention itself. 159 When Charles Pinkney of South Caro-
lina proposed the clause, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, "thought it 
unnecessary, the prevailing liberality being a security ag[ain]st such 
tests." 160 Gouvernour Morris of Pennsylvania voiced approval, and the 
No Religious Test Clause to Article VI passed unanimously. 161 
Some believed that the oath to support the Constitution, which 
was required of federal and state office holders by Article VI, was itself a 
religious test. 162 At the Connecticut Ratifying Convention, Oliver Wol-
cott did not "see the necessity of a test. . . . [t]he Constitution enjoins 
an oath upon all the officers of the United States. This is a direct appeal 
to that God who is the avenger of perjury. Such an appeal to him is a 
full acknowledgment of his being and providence." 163 It seems Wolcott 
was not taking into account the choice of oath or affirmation, which 
made the oath, and any test it may imply, a constitutional option rather 
than a requirement. An optional oath could not therefore function as a 
religions test. The state representatives of South Carolina, also thinking 
that an oath of allegiance to the Constitution would be a religious test, 
"[r]esolved that the third section of the Sixth Article ought to be 
amended by inserting the word 'other' between the word 'no' and 'relig-
ious."'164 The relevant portion of Article VI would then have read, "but 
159 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 461 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter RECORDS]. 
160 2 id. at 468 (Madison's Notes for that day indicate that Pinkney made the motion and that 
Sherman made this observation). See also Introduction, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, supra note 159, at xi-xiv, xv-xix (a journal of the deliberations of the Constitu-
tional Convention was kept, and several delegates also kept notes, among which were Madison's 
Notes). 
161 2 REcoRDs, supra note 159, at 468 (Madison's Notes record Gouvernour Morris's ap-
proval. The journal entry for August 30, 1787, indicates the motion to add the words of the No 
Religious Test Clause was passed unanimously, with no debate. However, the journal of the 
Convention indicates that in the vote for the entire Article VI, North Carolina opposed it, and 
the delegations from Connecticut and Maryland were divided. Madison also recorded North 
Carolina as opposed, but only Maryland divided. It may be that the journal's addition of Con-
necticut is correct, due to the observations of Sherman who was from Connecticut.). 
162 Originalist Analysis, supra note 131, at 16 5 5-56. 
163 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 203 Oonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS]. 
164 Philip Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARYL. 
REv. 839, 849 (1986). See also Proposed Amendment, South Carolina Ratifying Convention, 4 
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 152, at art. 6, cl. 3, no. 23, http://presspubs.u 
chicago.edu/founders/documents/a6_3s23.html. 
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no other religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any 
Office or public Trust under the United States." 165 
Madison argued that the oath of office itself could function as a 
religious test, at least a private one based on a personal belief in God as 
opposed to a public declaration of belief: 166 
Is not a religious test as far as it is necessary, or would operate, in-
volved in the oath itself? If the person swearing believes in the su-
preme Being who is invoked, and in the penal consequences of 
offending him, either in this or a future world, or both, he will be 
under the same restraint from perjury as if he had previously sub-
scribed a test requiring this belief. If the person in question be an 
unbeliever in these points and would notwithstanding take the oath, a 
previous test could have no effect. He would subscribe it as he would 
take the oath, without any principle that could be affected by 
either. 167 
This discussion also sidesteps the point made above, that an optional 
oath could not serve as a religious test. But Madison's discussion is 
somewhat more subtle and provocative. He recognized that a religious 
test professing a particular religious belief accomplishes nothing more 
than what an oath accomplishes. No one can know if a public declara-
tion of religious belief reflects what the person sincerely believes. Any 
religious test separate from the oath of office would add no further guar-
antee of the declarant's truthfulness or religiosity that the oath itself did 
not provide. But, if no one except the test- or oath-taker knows of the 
sincerity of his declaration, then it is difficult to see how the oath itself 
provides any guarantee or confidence that what has been said is true. 168 
165 Bradley, supra note 131, at 698 ("In fact, this change was proposed in both the House and 
in the Senate during the First Congressional session which passed the Bill of Rights."). 
166 Originalist Analysis, supra note 131, at 1656. 
167 James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 
152, at art. 6, cl. 3, no. 13 (1787), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/docu 
ments/a6_3s13.html.at 
l68 In an essay defending the No Religious Test Clause, Oliver Ellsworth, a delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention, entertains the possibility that a non-sectarian statement of belief in 
God and the scriptures would be "the least exceptionable" and create a "greater confidence in 
[the officeholder's] integrity." Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder, no. 7, 4 THE FOUNDERS' CoNSTI-
TlffION, supra note 152, at art. 6, cl. 3, no. 14, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/ 
founders/documents/a6_3sl4.html. But he goes on to reject this: 
His making a declaration of such belief is no security at all. For suppose him to be an 
unprincipled man, who believes neither the word nor the being of God; and to be 
governed merely by selfish motives; how easy is it for him to dissemble! How easy is it 
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The oath, then, like the religious test, had no real efficacy in assuring 
that what the oath taker said was true, or what he promised was reliable. 
Furthermore, if the oath is, in effect, a religious test, then, like the relig-
ious test, it should never be required, since either would impose a bur-
den on nonbelievers. 
William Williams, 169 a signer of the Declaration of Independence 
and participant in the Connecticut ratification debates, expressed dissat-
isfaction with the prohibition of a religious test. He pursued the logical 
extreme of Madison's suggestion that religious tests and oaths were 
equivalent, and made the point that the arguments against the religious 
test, "would apply with equal force against requiring an oath from any 
officer of the united or individual states; and with little abatement, to 
any oath in any case whatever." 170 If religious tests add nothing to the 
oath because such declarations are meaningless, why even retain the 
oath? However, Williams also noted, "divine and human wisdom, with 
universal experience, have approved and established them [oaths] as use-
ful, and a security to mankind." 171 
Among the members of the. founding generation, the notion that 
religious tests were illiberal, unnecessary or useless, was by no means 
unanimous. Many were concerned that in the absence of religious tests, 
the country's leaders would not be exemplars of Protestant belief and 
virtue. This view hearkens back to the pre-Lockean notion that a nation 
should be unified in regard to religion. 172 The American corollary 
would be that only Protestants were fit to rule a nation that was over-
whelmingly Protestant. 173 In protesting that the oath of office of the 
1780 Massachusetts Constitution only required a profession of Christi-
for him to make a public declaration of his belief in the creed which the law 
prescribes, and excuse himself by calling it a mere formality. This is the case with the 
test-laws and creeds in England. 
Id. The arguments of Madison and Ellsworth echo the cynical and sometimes satirical com-
ments made regarding the oaths imposed on the British people during the seventeenth century. 
See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text. But their comments also anticipate the argu-
ments of many subsequent commentators that the oath itself, insofar as it makes use of a private 
religious belief which could easily be dissembled, is a useless guarantor of truthfulness and, as 
part of a reform of judicial procedure, should be abolished. 
169 Bruce P. Stark, WILLIAMS, William, (1731-1811), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE 
U.S. CONG. ( 1975), http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay. pl? index= W000546. 
170 William Williams, Letter, 4 THE FOUNDERS' CoNSTITUTION, supra note 152, at art. 6, 
cl. 3, no. 21 (1788), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a6_3s21.html. 
171 Id. 
172 See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. 
173 See Bradley, supra note 131, at 681-84. 
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anity, and not Protestant Christianity, the town of Springfield argued, 
"As the People of this Commonwealth are generally, if not universally, 
of the Protestant reformed religion, it would be a matter of Great and 
General Concern that any person might be elected . . . over them or 
their Posterity, who should not be of the Protestant Religion." 174 For 
many Americans, being a Protestant Christian was likely to be a guaran-
tee of the good character desired in a ruler. As Colonel Jones stated at 
the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 
[R] ulers ought to believe in God or Christ; and ... however a test may 
be prostituted in England, ... if our public men were to be those who 
had a good standing in the church, it would be happy for the United 
States . . . . [A] person could not be a good man without being a good 
Christian. 175 
The issue of whether non-Protestants could serve as public officials 
particularly worried the opponents of the Constitution, the anti-federal-
ists. 176 They raised the fear that without a religious test, nothing in the 
Constitution prevented a non-Protestant from becoming president, so 
that believers in any religion, or even non-believers, could come to oc-
cupy that office. This became a strong tactical argument against ap-
proval of the newly drafted Constitution, and the anti-federalists were 
doggedly imaginative in exploiting it. "One New Hampshire anti-feder-
alist objected that a 'Turk, a Jew, a Roma[n] Catholic, and what is worse 
than all, a Universal[ist] may be President of the United States.' ... 
'Pagans,' 'deists,' 'heathens,' and 'Mahometans' were variously added to 
the list." 177 In North Carolina, Henry Abbott expressed the fear that 
174 Id. at 684 (citing C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNER & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL 
ESTABLISHMENT 95 (1964) (citing 276 Massachusetts Archives 66)). 
I 75 Id. at 709 (citing DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1788, at 221 (1856) (speech of Colonel Jones) [hereinafter DE-
BATES AND CONVENTIONS, MAss.J). 
176 Id. at 694-713. 
177 Id. at 696-97 (citing for Turk, Jew, Roman Catholic and Universalist, 2 H.C. WINGATE, 
LIFE AND LETTERS OF PAINE WINGATE 487 (1930) (Letter of Sullivan to Belknap on February 
26, 1788)). Bradley also notes similar arguments at the Virginia and North Carolina Conven-
tions, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 163, at 631 (Virginia) 
(speech of James Innes), and 4 id. at 191-205 (North Carolina). For "pagans," see id. at 198 
(speech of Governor Samuel Johnston); for "deists," see DEBATES AND CONVENTIONS, MAss., 
supra note 175, at 219; for "heathens," see 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS, supra note 163, at 199 (speech of David Caldwell); and ""Mahometans," see 4 id. at 194 
(speech of James Iredell). Universalism is a religious view that affirms the ultimate salvation of 
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the federal government might use its treaty-making power to engage 
"with foreign powers to adopt the Roman Catholic Religion in the 
United States, which would prevent the people from worshipping God 
according to their own consciences." 178 Also in North Carolina, David 
Caldwell saw in the absence of a religious test, "an invitation for Jews 
and pagans of every kind to come among us, at some future period, ... 
this might endanger the character of the United States." 179 In Virginia, 
there were those who argued "that Turks, Jews, Infidels, Christians, and 
all other sects, may be Presidents, and command the fleet and army, 
there being no test to be required." 180 In Massachusetts, Reverend 
Thatcher "shuddered at the idea that Roman Catholics, Papists, and 
Pagans may be introduced into office; and that Popery and the Inquisi-
tion may be established in America." 181 
Of particular note was the hostility and fear the founders had for 
Muslims and Catholics. The historic struggles between Christendom 
and Islam, and between Protestants and Catholics, lay behind this fear. 
Some Protestant propaganda linked Catholics and Muslims as mortal 
enemies of true religion. During the Reformation, woodcuts of the 
twin-headed monster of Protestant thought depicted the Ottoman Sul-
tan as the Anti-Christ on one side, and the Pope on the other. 182 One 
had a turban, the other a mitre, "but both projected threat and apoca-
lyptic intent for the Protestant world." 183 
Even the champion of religious toleration, Locke, aside from his 
intolerance for atheists, had reservations about extending religious free-
dom to Catholics and Muslims. Locke was concerned about loyalties to 
foreign religious authorities that could affect temporal matters. "That 
Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is 
all humans. Unitarian UniversalistAssociation, 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 18, 
at 9470. 
178 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 163, at 191-92 
(speech of Heniy Abbott). 
179 4 id at 199 (speech of David Caldwell) ("I think, then, ... that, in a political view, those 
gentlemen who formed this Constitution should not have given this invitation to Jews and 
heathens. All those who have any religion are against the emigration of those people from the 
eastern hemisphere."). 
l80 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 163, at 635 (speech 
of James Innes). 
181 DEBATES AND CONVENTIONS, MAss., supra note 175, at 251. 
182 Denise A. Spellberg, Could a Muslim be President? An Eighteenth Century Constitutional 
Debate, in 39 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUDIES 485, 488 (2006). 
183 Id. 
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constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do 
thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of 
another prince." 184 Thus, Locke indirectly referred to Catholics and ac-
corded them "no right to be tolerated by the magistrate" for asserting 
"that kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms" and for 
arrogating "unto themselves the power of deposing kings, because they 
challenge the power of excommunication, as the peculiar right of their 
hierarchy." 185 And regarding Muslims, he wrote, 
It is ridiculous for anyone to profess himself to be a Mohametan only 
in his religion, but in everything else a faithful subject to a Christian 
magistrate, while at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to 
yield blind obedience to the Mufti of Constantinople, who himself is 
entirely obedient to the Ottoman Emperor and frames the feigned 
oracles of that religion according to his pleasure. 186 
While all those who debated the acceptability of the Constitution 
in the various state ratifying conventions might have conceded the un-
likelihood that a non-Protestant could be elected president in the near 
future, it was nevertheless understood that the Constitution would serve 
as the blueprint for governing the nation into the distant and unforesee-
able future when the population of the nation could change profoundly. 
In the North Carolina debate, Charles Lancaster dismissed the idea of a 
184 LOCKE, supra note 70, at 55. 
185 Id. at 54. See also Bradley, supra note 131, at 699 ("In the American mind, Catholics 
were spiritually tyrannized by a Romish clergy, and the lack of autonomous moral judgment 
characteristic of Protestants rendered Catholics ill-suited and, to many, completely unfit co be 
Americans. . . . That the founders' anti-Catholicism would be difficult to overestimate can be 
gleaned from the ratification debate over article VI."). 
186 LOCKE, supra note 70, at 56. Though Muslims may have been more exotic, they were, if 
anything, more despised, for at the time, "[R)eal American struggles with the Muslim states of 
North Africa continued, and remembered European military conflict with the Ottoman Empire 
endured ... " Spellberg, supra note 182, at 486. Professor Bradley discusses the prejudices that 
the various Protestant sects had cowards each other as well as cowards non-Protestants: 
[T[he Episcopal Church ... was disdained and resented by many who had exper-
ienced the sting of its colonial establishment. Baptists were widely viewed as enemies 
of good government, a disposition satisfactorily evidenced (to most minds) by the 
political lunacy of cha~ Baptist refuge, Rhode Island. All this supplemented the en-
during hostility to Jews among the founders, as demonstrated by Morton Borden. 
Attitudes cowards Catholics were no better. 'Turks,' 'Infidels,' 'heathens,' and their 
peers lay totally behind the horizons of civility. 
Bradley, supra note 131, at 701-02 (citing MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TuRKS, AND INFIDELS, 3-
22 (1984)). 
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Pope president, but also expressed keen awareness about the future sig-
nificance of a Constitution lacking a religious test: 
For my part, . . . I did not suppose that the Pope could occupy the 
President's chair. But let us remember that we form a government for 
millions not yet in existence. I have not the art of divination. In the 
course of four or five hundred years, I do not know how it will work. 
This is most certain, that Papists may occupy that chair, and 
Mohometans may take it. I see nothing against it. There is a disquali-
fication, I believe, in every state in the Union - it ought to be so in 
this system. 187 
In the Massachusetts debate, Amos Singletary complained that under 
the Constitution, "a papist or an infidel were as eligible [for public of-
fice as a Christian]," and lamented, "[In] this instance we were giving 
great power to - we know not whom." 188 
C. The Abbott-Iredell Debate 
The fear of the "other" represented by non-Protestants who would 
immigrate and overwhelm the Protestant population provoked the de-
fining confrontation between Henry Abbott and Charles Iredell in the 
North Carolina debate. With bitter sarcasm, Abbott laid down the 
challenge: 
The exclusion of religious tests is thought by many to be dangerous 
and impolitic. They suppose that if there be no religious test required, 
pagans, deists, and Mahometans might obtain offices among us, and 
that senators and representatives might all be pagans. . . . Some are 
desirous to know how and by whom they are to swear, since no relig-
ious tests are required - whether they are to swear by Jupiter, Juno, 
Minerva, Proserpine, or Pluto. . . . I would be glad some gentleman 
would endeavor to obviate these objections. 189 
James Iredell, 190 a future Supreme Court Justice, took up the challenge. 
First, Iredell reminded the North Carolinian representatives, many of 
187 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 163, at 215. 
188 Bradley, supra note 131, at 710-11 (citing DEBATES AND CONVENTIONS, MAss., supra 
note 175, at 143). 
189 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 163, at 192. 
190 See fames Iredell, Sr., NORTH CAROLINA HISTORY PROJECT, http://www.northcarolinahis 
tory.org/commentary/105/entry Qames Iredell (1751-1799) was a North Carolina superior 
court judge, and attorney general, and political essayist who espoused the cause to ratify the 
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whom were not Anglicans, of the "utmost cruelties" that existed in 
Great Britain "[u]nder color of religious tests: In [England] no man can 
be a member of the House of Commons, or hold any office under the 
crown, without taking the sacrament according to the rites of the 
Church." 191 He spoke of how this rule "must degrade and profane the 
rite," and of the hypocrisy whereby "dissenters qualify themselves for 
office [by taking the sacrament] though they never conform to the 
church on any other occasion; and men of no religion at all have no 
scruple to make use of this qualification." 192 With some humor and 
sarcasm of his own, Iredell addressed the question of whether a Pope 
could ever become the President of the United States: 
A native of America must have very singular good fortune, who, after 
residing fourteen years in his own country, should go to Europe, enter 
into Romish orders, obtain the promotion of cardinal, afterwards that 
of pope, and at length be so much in the confidence of his own coun-
try as to be elected President. It would be still more extraordinary if 
he should give up his popedom for our presidency. 193 
"But," Iredell responded, "it is objected that the people of America may, 
perhaps, choose representatives who have no religion at all, and that 
pagans and Mahometans may be admitted into offices." 194 He 
continued: 
But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away 
that principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so warmly con-
tend for. . . . If you admit the least difference, the door to persecution 
is open. . . . It would be happy for mankind if religion was permitted 
to take its own course, and maintain itself by the excellence of its own 
doctrines. The divine Author of our religion never wished for its sup-
port by worldly authority. Has he not said that the gates of hell shall 
not prevail against it? It made much greater progress for itself, than 
when supported by the greatest authority upon earth. 195 
Constitution. In 1791, President George Washington appointed him one of the original justices 
of the Supreme Court.). 
l9l 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 163 at, 192-93. 
1 9 2 4 id. at 193. 
193 4 id. at 196. 
194 Id. at 194. 
195 Id. 
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Thus Iredell contemplated the independence of religious and political 
activity so that no particular religion, nor religion in general, would 
have support from the government, but rather religious belief would 
survive on its own merits. Along with this, Iredell envisaged the possi-
ble election to public office, not only of non-Protestants, but of non-
Christians, specifically, Muslims, and those "who have no religion at 
all."196 
It is plausible to see such liberal advocacy of religious toleration 
expressed during the ratification controversy as disingenuous speech-
ifying, calculated merely to win the debate over acceptance of the Con-
stitution, or as silly theorizing about the ascent of non-Protestants to 
high political offices at a time when, realistically speaking, no represen-
tative really thought he would ever see the election of a Catholic, Jew, 
Muslim, or atheist rise to any significant position in the government of 
the United States. 197 The next part of the Abbott/Iredell debate, how-
ever, must moderate this view. 
196 Id. In referring to those "who have no religion at all" was Iredell including non-believing 
atheists as possible holders of public office? "During the eighteenth and nineteenth century in 
the young United States, Deists, Universalises, Transcendentalists, and others were labeled as 
atheists and even new religions that self-described themselves as Christian, such as the Mormon 
church, were regarded with suspicion, if not outright hostiliry .... [i]nvectives against atheists 
were relatively rare; the closest thing to an atheist most commentators even considered was the 
deist, that is, someone who believed in a divine creator but not in the divinity of Christ." Bruce 
F rohnen, The Bases of Professional Respomibility: Pluralism and Community in Early America, 63 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 931, 936 (1995). Whatever its significance, the term "atheist" arises 
elsewhere in the state debates regarding the Constitution. Judge Samuel Spencer also spoke on 
the topic of the religious test in the North Carolina debate and commented, "It is feared, ... 
that persons of bad principles, Deists, Atheists, & etc., may come into this country; and there is 
nothing to restrain them from being eligible to offices." 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 163, at 200. Like Iredell, he believed religion should stand on 
its own, without government support. "[A]s there is not a religious test required, it leaves relig-
ion on the solid foundation of its own inherent validity, without any connection with temporal 
authority; ... I cannot object to this part of the Constitution. I wish every other part was as 
good and proper." Id. In the Massachusetts debate, the issue of atheists was also specifically 
raised. Theophilus Parsons noted the objection, "that the Constitution provides no religious test 
by oath, and we may have in power unprincipled men, atheists and pagans." DEBATES AND 
CONVENTIONS, MASs., supra note 175, at 190. Parsons also committed himself to the demo-
cratic ideal, "[l]t must remain with the electors to give the government this security." Id. 
197 Bradley argues that the Anti-Federalists blundered in raising the possibility that a non-
Protestant population could take power in the United States and install a non-Protestant govern-
ment. The assumption worked to the advantage of the Federalists who argued that a prohibition 
on religious tests would protect rather than endanger Protestants. Bradley maintains that the 
argument was not based on an idealistic philosophy of religious roleration, but rather on 
Madison's notion that sectarian variety maintained the peace by preventing any one sect from 
becoming dominant over the others. 'The submission here is that our present regime of relig-
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Abbott, not quite ready to give up on his argument, reminded Ire-
dell that he had neglected to address his earlier query regarding the form 
of the oath. 198 In response to this second challenge, Iredell provided a 
definition of an oath: "a solemn appeal to the Supreme Being, for the 
truth of what is said, by a person who believes in the existence of a 
Supreme Being and in a future state of rewards and punishments, ac-
cording to that form which will bind his conscience most." 199 He then 
went on to deliver a creditable history of the oath, in which he outlined 
how at one time only Christians could swear an oath on the New Testa-
ment, and how an exception was made for the Jews, though "heathens 
were excluded altogether."200 "At length," Iredell explained, "by the op-
eration of principles of toleration, these narrow notions were done away 
with."201 He then declared, "[i]n regard to the form of an oath, that 
ought to be governed by the religion of the person taking it," and went 
on to provide a detailed summary of the Omychund case: 
ious liberty . . . is a political outcome due to historically prevailing conditions of religious 
pluralism. Most importantly, it is not the product of a commitment by the people, their repre-
sentatives, or by the Supreme Court to toleration or to religious liberty as a matter of abstract 
principle." Bradley, supra note 131, at 678. See also Spellberg, supra note 182, at 502 ("Al-
though federalists such as Iredell and Johnston created this discursive possibility [a place for 
Muslims in the policy], they never believed the rights for which they argued in principle would 
ever come co be tested by real Muslims in practice. . . . [I]n defense of the Constitution, 
federalists were forced co concede any possibility of a Muslim president in 1788. That they did 
so, however reluctantly, suggested chat Americans might proceed differently to define their na-
tional ideals despite the inherited prejudices of their day."). Although Iredell and others argued 
chat government should not support religion, they also believed chat the people would not allow 
non-Protestants in office. Iredell said, "[b]uc it is never to be supposed that the people of 
America will trust their dearest rights to persons who have no religions at all, or a religion 
materially different from their own." 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, 
supra note 163 at 198-94. But in his speech supporting Iredell, Johnston conceded, "(c]hose 
who are Mahometans, or any ochers who are not professors of the Christian religion, can never 
be elected co the office of President, or ocher high office, but in one of two cases. First, if the 
people of America lay aside the Christian religion altogether, it may happen. Should chis unfor-
tunately take place, the people will choose such men as chink as they do themselves. Another 
case is, if any persons of such descriptions should, notwithstanding their religion, acquire the 
confidence and esteem of the people of America by their good conduct and practice of virtue, 
they may be chosen." 4 id. at 198-99. Johnston added one ocher sentence indicating some 
skepticism that chis could happen, . "I leave it to gentlemen's candor to judge what probability 
there is of the people's choosing men of different sentiments from themselves." 4 id. 
198 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS supra note 163, at 196. 
199 4 id. 
200 4 id. at 196-97. 
201 4 id. at 197. 
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A very remarkable instance also happened in England, about forty 
years ago, of a person who was admitted to take an oath according to 
the rites of his own country, though he was a heathen. Not believing 
either in the Old or the New Testament, he could not be sworn in the 
accustomed manner, but was sworn according to the form of the Gen-
too religion, which he professed, by touching the foot of a priest .... 
It was accordingly held by the judges, ... that the oath ought to be 
received; they considering that it was probable those of that religion 
were equally bound in conscience by an oath according to their oath 
of swearing, as they themselves were by one of theirs; and that it 
would be a reproach to the justice of the country, if a man, merely 
because he was of a different religion, should be denied redress of an 
injury he had sustained. Ever since this great case, it has been univer-
sally considered that, in administering an oath, it is only necessary to 
inquire if the person who is to take it, believes in a Supreme Being, 
and in a state of rewards and punishments. If he does, the oath is to 
be administered according to that form which it is supposed will bind 
his conscience most. 202 
341 
Iredell's conclusion was that the form of the oath "may well be entrusted 
to the general government, to be applied on the principles I have men-
tioned."203 Thus he demonstrated that the right to swear an oath by 
non-Christian ceremonies was already part of the common law and ac-
cepted in the courts of England and the American states. Furthermore, 
Iredell linked the right to swear a testamentary oath in this manner to 
the oath of office because of the very context in which he raised the 
Omychund case: a debate regarding religious tests for public office. The 
prospect of a non-Christian swearing an oath by non-Christian scrip-
tures and ceremonies was not merely a hypothetical that might occur in 
some distant future time. His argument, based on straightforward legal 
precedent, showed that neither the religion nor the form of oath should 
disqualify a candidate for public office, so that someone who is not a 
Protestant or even a Christian may hold any office in the federal govern-
ment of the new nation. 
It was for Isaac Backus in the Massachusetts debate to articulate 
what was probably the most compelling argument for the No Religious 
Test Clause. Backus argued, "Some serious minds discover a concern 
lest, if all religious tests should be excluded, the Congress would hereaf-
202 4 id. at 198. 
203 4 id. 
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ter establish Popery, or some other tyrannical way of worship. But it is 
most certain that no such way of worship can be established without any 
religious test. "204 If, indeed, Roman Catholics or members of any other 
religion became numerous in the United States, the religious test would 
be the ready means to make the majority faith the required religion of 
office holders. Not only would a religious test fail to guarantee the good 
character of future office holders, but it would also fail to protect Ameri-
can Protestantism. It is instead the prohibition of any religious test that 
guaranteed for Protestants free exercise should they ever become a mi-
nority. 205 As Bradley put it, the No Religious Test Clause may well have 
passed because "the instinct to be free of oppression is stronger than the 
temptation to oppress."206 
D. Two Muslim Oaths 
The state debates regarding the No Religious Test Clause recog-
nized that approval of the Constitution, and, in particular, approval of 
the No Religious Test Clause, was a commitment to ending the require-
ment that public officials subscribe to any particular religious belief. 
The debates and the resulting approval of the Constitution were an im-
portant advance in the long and difficult struggle to extend the right to 
testify at court or take an oath of office without religious coercion. But 
the struggle was, and is, by no means over. 207 There remained the dis-
204 DEBATES AND CONVENTIONS, MAss., supra note 175, at 250-51. 
205 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 163, at 204. Cf id. 
at 330 (Madison's argument) ("Happily for the states, they enjoy the utmost freedom of relig-
ion. This freedom arises from chat multiplicity of sects which pervades America, and which is 
the best and only securiry for religious liberry in any sociery; for where there is such a variety of 
sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect co oppress and persecute the rest."); and Brad-
ley, supra note 131, at 703 ("The conic of Federalise 10 - that a mulcipliciry of antagonistic, 
aggressive sects was the only guarantee of spiritual freedom - was reiterated by Federalists in the 
ratifying Conventions, in the newspapers, and wherever religious freedom was thought to be 
endangered by the new Constitution."); and ]AMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 84 
(Mentor 1961) ("A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confed-
eracy, but the variery of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils 
against any danger from that source .. "). 
206 Bradley, supra note 131, at 703 ("Federalists said, in effect: anicle VI prevents you from 
subordinating the despicable sect of your choice. So it does. Bue it also protects you from the 
oppressive designs of all the other sects, who think that your views are despicable and would 
subordinate you - as you would them - if an instrument of oppression such as religious tests 
were available."). 
207 The exclusion of atheists from the tolerance expressed by Locke and in Omychund cast its 
shadow many years into the future. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text for the exclu-
sion stated by Locke and Omychund. 
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crimination against atheists. Omychund left the common law un-
changed in the requirement that a witness must believe in God and an 
order of punishment for bearing false witness. 208 Indeed, in spite of the 
Constitution, a general religious test often remained in place, one that 
replaced a declaration of belief in a particular sectarian creed with a 
more general belief in a Supreme Being who provided awards for the 
good and punishments for the bad. Though the British resolved the 
issue in the late nineteenth century, 209 testimony and qualifications for 
public office of avowed atheists could be barred or challenged in the 
courts of many American states well into the twentieth century.210 It 
208 White, supra note 46, at 391-92 ("The final conclusion of the common law, therefore is 
that an unbeliever is incompetenc to take an oath because it cannot have any binding effect upon 
him, and without the oath no person can be heard to give evidence, for, unless he invokes the 
vengeance of God for false swearing, there is no security that he will tell the truth."). 
209 See SEAR, supra note 122, at 21 (only after an extensive struggle was Charles Bradlaugh, 
an atheist, permitted to make an affirmation allowing him to serve in Parliamenc in 1888). Acts 
that Parliamenc passed in 1858, 1866, and 1868 reduced the three oaths co one and permitted 
Jews, Quakers, Moravians, and Separatists to make an affirmation in place of the oath. See 
Oaths of Allegiance etc. and Relief of the Jews Act 1858, 21 & 22 Viet., c. 48 (Eng.); Parliamen-
tary Oaths Act 1866, 29 Viet., c. 19, § 1, (Eng.); Promissory Oaths Act 1868, 31 & 32 Viet., c. 
72 (Eng.). However, atheists and agnostics, since they did not belong to these religious catego-
ries, were still not permitted to take the Parliamentary Oath. SEAR, supra at 122, at 21 (Charles 
Bradlaugh, well-known in his time for his radicalism and atheism, was elected to the House of 
Commons five times beginning in 1880. Bradlaugh argued chat the Evidence Amendment Aces 
of 1869 and 1870, which permitted him to make an affirmation in place of a testamentary oath 
in coun, should allow him to make an affirmation in place of an oath of allegiance to take his 
seat in Parliament. However, it was decided that the acts that concerned judiciary oaths did not 
apply to the Parliamentary Oath. He agreed to take the Oath but publically declared, "I shall, 
taking the oath, regard myself as bound not by the letter of its words, but by the spirit which the 
affirmation would have conveyed had I been permitted to use it." An objection was raised that 
because of these public statements, the oath Bradlaugh took was not binding and therefore 
invalid for admission to parliament. The House rejected a motion that he should have been 
allowed to make an affirmation and when he came to the House to argue his case and refused to 
withdraw, he was removed by the Sergeant-at -Arms. Twice Bradlaugh attempted to administer 
the oath to himself and was ejected. In 1886, however, the Speaker of the House refused to hear 
any objection to his seating, so he was allowed to take his seat without swearing the oath in its 
official form.). The Evidence Funher Amendment Act 1869 32 & 33 Viet., c. 68, (Eng.); The 
Evidence Further Amendment Act 1870 33 & 34 Viet., c. 49 (Eng.); Oaths Act 1888, 51 & 52 
Viet. c. 46 (Eng.). 
210 When Thomas Raeburn White published his anicle on Oaths in 1903, he found "[i]n 
thitty-three states and territories atheists or unbelievers have been made competent witnesses. 
The same is probably true of three others, but in fourteen and probably fifteen the common law 
rule [requiring belief in God and an order of rewards and punishments] is still unchanged." 
White, supra note 46, at 395. See also B.H. Hartogensis, Denial of Equal Rights to Religious 
Minorities and Non-Believers in the United States, 39 YALE L.J. 659, 666-673 (1930) (statutory 
and case law regarding requirement of religious belief for testamentary oaths and oaths of office); 
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was not until 1961 in the case of Torcaso v. Watkins211 that the Supreme 
Court ruled all requirements of religious belief or expression unconstitu-
tional. The Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1975, eliminated re-
ligion as a consideration in assessing the competence or credibility of a 
wimess.212 Yet, there are some state statutes current today whose inter-
pretation may lead to a violation of the Constitution because there is no 
provision for affirmation as an alternative to the oath, or because, even 
J. Crawford Biggs, Religious Belief as Qualification of a Witness, 8 N.C.L. REv. 31, 39 (1929-
1930) (stating "In the following States, a witness must believe in Divine punishment or in the 
existence of a Supreme Being to be competent to testify: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Mary-
land, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina."). See 
generally Paul W. Kaufman, Note, Disbelieving Nonbeliever: Atheism, Competence, and Credibility 
in the in the Turn of the Century American Courtroom, 15 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 395 (2003) 
(providing a review of state courts which before 1950 limited the courtroom testimony of athe-
ists. According to Kaufman, several states maintained rules disqualifying atheists well into the 
twentieth century. Nine states held atheists competent to testify, but allowed them to be cross-
examined about their beliefs for purposes of disputing their credibility.). 
211 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (addressing the constitutionality of Article 37 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights, which stated, "[N]o religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification 
for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of 
God.") Roy R. Torcaso had been appointed to the office of Notary Public by the governor of 
the state but was refused a commission because he would not declare his belief in God. He then 
brought suit in Maryland to compel the issuance of his commission, claiming that the require-
ment to declare this belief was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The Supreme Court of Maryland stated, "[l)t seems clear that under our Constitution disbelief 
in a Supreme Being, and the denial of any moral accountability for conduct, not only renders a 
person incompetent co hold public office, bur to give testimony, or serve as a juror. The histori-
cal record makes it clear that religious toleration, . . . was never thought to encompass the 
ungodly." Torcaso v. Watkins, 162 A.2d 438, 444 (Md. 1960). The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding, "This Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appel-
lant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him." 
212 FED. R. Evm. 601 (Rule 601 establishes inclusiviry by making all persons presumptively 
competent to testify, unless incompetence can be demonstrated: "Every person is competent to 
be a witness unless these rules provide otherwise."). Rule 603 provides for choice, "Before testi-
fying, a witness muse give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully." FED. R. Evm. 603. Ir 
does not require a particular form of oath, bur instead establishes that the oath or affirmation, 
"must be in a form designed to impress char duty on the witness's conscience." Id. The Advi-
sory Committee Nore to Rule 603 explains char the Rule affords "the flexibility required in 
dealing with religious adults," as well as "atheists [and) conscientious objectors." FED. R. Evm. 
603 advisory committee's note. Rule 610 stares, "Evidence of a witness's religious beliefs or 
opinions is nor admissible to attack or support the witness's credibility," thereby prohibiting the 
disqualification of witnesses on the basis of religions belief or the introduction of the witness's 
religious belief or the lack of such belief to discredit the witness. FED. R. Evm. 610. See 
generally Milhizer, supra note 46, at 32 ("The Federal Rules were developed by the Supreme 
Court and formally adopted in 1975. The Rules applied directly to the federal courts and 
served as model rules for rhe states, where they were widely incorporated in varying degrees."). 
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though such an alternative is provided, the proffered affirmation, like 
the oath, includes a religious reference.213 
Within the last decade, there have been two instances, one involv-
ing a testamentary oath and the other an oath of office, in which oaths 
taken by Muslims on the Qur'an were questioned. The latter was the 
case of Keith Ellison, mentioned in this Article's Introduction. Though 
that oath did not raise serious legal issues, it provoked a significant mea-
sure of immediate controversy and opposition, followed by eventual ac-
ceptance of the highly visible use of the Qur' an in an oath of office. 
The case of Syidah Matteen's proffered testamentary oath on the 
Qur'an, however, did lead to litigation, which, in regard to the state's 
opposition to allowing her to swear by the Qur' an, proved highly ironic 
in the light of the North Carolinian history reviewed above.214 
1. Syidah Matteen 
It's gotten way out there. They've got everything from the Book of 
Mormon to the Book of Wicca on the list. Our position is that the 
statute governs not only the type of oath, but the manner and adminis-
tration of the oath, and that it's now a legislative matter to straighten 
out.21s 
In August 2003, a Muslim woman named Syidah Matteen was 
called as a witness in a court proceeding in Guilford County, North 
Carolina.216 Matteen did not wish to swear on the Bible, and so she 
213 See Jonathan Belcher, Religion-Plus Speech: The Constitutionality of juror Oaths and Affir-
mations Under the First Amendment, 34 WM. & MARYL. R.Ev. 287, 298 nn.84 & 86 (1991) 
(listing state statutes which do not have affirmation as alternatives for juror oaths (note 84) or 
which have both oaths and affirmations which reference God (note 86)). Those which are still 
current are: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-12-132, -138, -139 (West 2012) (voir dire oath, civil juror 
oath, and criminal juror oath with no affirmation alternative); ALA. CODE§§ 12-16-170, -171 
(2012) (jurors swear or affirm with reference to God); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.10 (West 2012); 
Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-71 (West 2012); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 606:2 (2012)(criminal). 
214 See supra notes 189-203 and infra notes 246-261 and accompanying text. 
215 Patrik Jonsson, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Tell the Truth ... on the Koran?, 
CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR Quly 20, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0720/p02s02-
usju.html (Senior Superior Court Judge of Guilford Counry, W. Douglas Albright, explaining 
why he would not permit a witness to swear on the Qur'an in his courthouse). 
216 ACLU of N.C. v. North Carolina, 639 S.E.2d 136, 137 (N.C. App. 2007). See also 
Daniel Blau, Holy Scriptures and Unholy Strictures: Why the Enforcement of a Religious Orthodoxy 
in North Carolina Demands a More Refined Establishment Clause Analysis of Courtroom Oaths, 4 
FrnsT AMEND. L. R.Ev. 223, 223 (2006); Nadine Farid, Oath and Affirmation in the Court: 
Thoughts on the Power of a Sworn Promise, 40 NEW ENG. L. R.Ev. 555, 558 (2006); Milhizer, 
supra note 46, at 1 & n.4. 
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requested that she be allowed to swear on the Qur' an. 217 Because there 
was no Qur'an available, she agreed to make an affirmarion.218 Later 
that month, Ms. Matteen returned to the courthouse with copies of the 
Qur'an, which the nearby Al-Ummil Ummat Islamic Center offered to 
donate to the Guilford County courts so that Muslim jurors and wit-
nesses could be sworn on them.219 The Guilford County judges de-
clined to accept the donation, stating that an oath on the Qur' an would 
not be a legal oath under North Carolina State law.220 In June 2005, 
Ms. Marteen was a witness in another matter before another judge at the 
Guilford County Court. 221 She again requested to be sworn on the 
Qur' an, and was again refused. 222 
Under North Carolina law, there are three alternatives that a per-
son may choose in taking an official oath.223 North Carolina General 
Statute, § 11-2, a law, which dates back to 1777, provided the first 
alternative: 
[T]he party [shall] ... lay his hand upon the Holy Scriptures, in token 
of his engagement to speak the truth and in further token that, if he 
should swerve from the truth, he may be justly deprived of all the 
blessings of that holy book and made liable to that vengeance which 
he has imprecated on his own head. 224 
217 ACLU of N.C., 639 S.E.2d at 137. 
21s Id. 
2 19 Gary D. Robenson, Quran-in-Court Case Can Advance State Panel Rules, STARNEWS ON-
LINE Oanuary 17, 2007, 12:30 am) StarNews Online, http://www.starnewsonline.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/anicle?p=2&tc=pg&AID=/20070117/NEWS/701170440/-1/State ("The issue surfaced 
after Muslims from the Al-Ummil Ummat Islamic Center in Greensboro tried to donate copies 
of the Quran to Guilford Counry's two counhouses."). 
220 Id. ("Two Guilford judges declined to accept the texts, saying an oath on the Quran is not 
a legal oath under state law."); Amended Complaint 'JI 58, at 2-3, ACLU of N.C. v. North 
Carolina, No. 05 CVS 9872 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 29, 2005) ("The Al-Ummat Islamic center of 
Greensboro, North Carolina, in June 2005, offered to donate copies of the Quran to the 
Guilford Counry coun system so that Muslim wirnesses and jurors could be sworn in on their 
holy text; however, Guilford County judicial officials refused this request."); Eric Collins, Judges 
Question Use of Quran in Taking Oath, AM. MusLIM PERSP. Oune 18, 2005), http:// 
archives2005.ghazali.net/html/caking_oath.html ("There appears to have been a misunderstand-
ing about whether the court would accept the Qur'ans for the purpose of oaths."). 
221 Farid, supra note 216, at 558. 
222 Id. 
223 Blau, supra note 216, at 224. 
224 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 11-2 (West 2013) (the statute is still on the books). 
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The second alternative accommodates a person who is "conscientiously 
scrupulous of taking a book oath."225 It excuses such a person from 
"laying hands upon, or touching the Holy Gospel,"226 but requires the 
witness to "stand with his right hand lifted up towards heaven, in token 
of his solemn appeal to the Supreme God, and also in token that if he 
should swerve from the truth he would draw down the vengeance of 
heaven upon his head."227 The person would then state, "I, A.B., do 
appeal to God, as a witness of the truth and the avenger of falsehood, as 
I shall answer the same at the great day of judgment, when the secrets of 
all hearts shall be known (etc., as the words of the oath may be)."228 
The third choice permits an affirmation for a person who has "conscien-
tious scruples against taking the oath" as prescribed by the first two 
alternatives.229 Such a witness "shall be permitted to be affirmed. In all 
cases the words of the affirmation shall be the same as the words of the 
prescribed oath, except that the word 'affirm' shall be substituted for the 
word 'swear' and the words 'so help me God' shall be deleted."230 
The Senior Superior Court Judge of Guilford County, W. Douglas 
Albright, interpreted the reference to "Holy Scriptures" in North Caro-
lina General Statute, section 11-2, as referring to the Christian Bible 
alone. 231 He therefore maintained, "An oath on the Quran is not a 
lawful oath under our law."232 Because of this position, the Guilford 
County judges refused to allow Ms. Matteen to take her oath upon the 
Qur' an and refused to accept the Qur' ans offered by the Islamic 
Center.233 The only choices open to her were the oath of section 11-3, 
in which the oath-taker swears to "the Supreme God" with raised right 
hand,234 or the affirmation of section 11-4, designed for those who did 




229 Id. § 11-4. See generally id. § 11-7 (concerns the State oath of office). 
230 Id. § 11-4. 
231 Collins, supra note 220. 
232 Jonsson, supra note 215. 
233 Blau, supra note 216, at 224 (citing Amended Complaint, ACLU ofN.C. v. North Caro-
lina, No. 05 CVS 9872 (N.C. Sup. Ct. July 26, 2005)) (the Complaint stating, "Guilford 
County Senior Resident Court Judge W. Douglas Albright and Guilford County Chief District 
Judge Joseph E. Turner have stated that the Christian Bible is the only religious text which can 
be used to swear in individuals pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 11-2 in Guilford County."). 
234 The form of taking an oath with uplifted hand rather than with scripture is associated 
with Scotland and dissenting Christian sects. "Even among the different sects of Christians, 
there may be different forms of taking the oath. . . . S. 5 of the Oaths Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Viet. 
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not wish to make any reference to God at all. But North Carolina law 
provided no alternative, which sanctioned an oath on the Qur' an. 
On June 28, 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter 
"ACLU") requested the North Carolina Administrative Office of the 
Court (hereinafter "NCAOC") to adopt a policy that would allow 
"members of different faiths to be sworn in on the religious text 
honored by their faith if they choose."235 On July 14, the NCAOC 
declined to interpret section 11-2, "as it is within the purview of the 
General Assembly and the Courts to determine how oaths are to be 
administered pursuant to Chapter 11 of the General Statutes of North 
Carolina."236 On July 26, 2005, the ACLU of North Carolina filed suit 
against the State of North Carolina seeking a declaratory judgment "that 
the exclusive use of the Christian Bible in North Carolina courts was 
discriminatory towards non-Christians and seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the term 'Holy Scriptures' as set out in N.C.G.S. 11-2 in-
cludes not just the Christian Bible, but other religious texts, including 
but not limited to, the Quran, the Old Testament and the Bhagavad-
Gita. "237 In the alternative, if the term "Holy Scriptures" did not in-
clude "all religious texts," the ACLU of North Carolina asked the Court 
to declare the statute unconstitutional and a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the 
North Carolina Constitution.238 
The State sought to dismiss the case for lack of standing, arguing 
that no case or controversy existed because Ms. Matteen had decided to 
affirm when called as a witness in 2003, thereby resolving the contra-
c. 46), which enacts chat 'if any person to whom an oath is administered desires co swear with 
uplifted hand, in the form and manner in which an oath is usually administered in Scotland, (a) 
he shall be permitted co do so, and the oath shall be administered co him in such form and 
manner without further question,' appears only co be declaratory of che common law." SIR 
JOHN JERVIS, ARCHBOALo's PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 406 
(1905). 
235 Blau, supra note 216, at 225 & n.10 (citing Letter from Sheleigh Kenney, Scaff Attorney, 
American Civil Liberties Union of N.C. (ACLU-NC), and Seth Cohen, General Counsel, 
ACLU-NC Legal Foundation, co Ralph Walker, Director, North Carolina Administrative Office 
of the Courts Oune 28, 2005)). 
236 Complaint and Request for Declaratory Judgment 'j[ 7, at 2, ACLU of N.C., v. North 
Carolina, No. 05 CVS 9872 (N.C. Sup. Ct . July 26, 2005). 
237 Id. 'j[ 11, at 3. 
238 Id. 'j[ 12, at 3. Article I, section 13 of the North Carolina Constitution states, "All per-
sons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God according co the dictates of 
their own consciences, and no human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere 
with the rights of conscience." N.C. CONST. arc. l, § 13. 
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versy.239 Arguments were heard on December 5, 2005, in the Wake 
County Superior Court. Four days later, Judge Donald Smith agreed 
that there was no justiciable controversy and dismissed the case.240 
The ACLU appealed, and on January 16, 2007, the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals reversed, finding that there was no impediment to 
litigation, and indeed the litigation was inevitable.241 The case went 
back to the Wake County Superior Court. In the meantime, the North 
Carolina legislature considered a statute which would allow "the party to 
be sworn to place the party's hand upon the Bible or any text sacred to 
the party's religious faith" and delete the words, "So help me God" if 
appropriate to the person's faith. 242 However, on May 24, 2007, Supe-
rior Court Judge Paul Ridgeway held "as a matter of common law of 
North Carolina and under the authority of clear precedent of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court, oaths are to be administered in a form, and 
upon such sacred texts, including texts other than the Holy Bible, that a 
witness or juror holds to be 'most sacred and obligatory upon their con-
science."'243 The State had thirty days to appeal the decision, but took 
no action, effectively ending the controversy. 
239 ACLU of N.C. v. North Carolina, 639 S.E.2d 136, 137-38 (N.C. App. 2007) (stating 
that on November 29, 2005, the ACLU of North Carolina filed an amended complaint adding 
Syidah Matteen as a plaintiff). 
240 Id. at 138. Blau, supra note 216, at 226 & n.19 (citing Wake County Superior Court 
Order and Judgment, ACLU ofN.C. v. North Carolina, No. 05 CVS 9872 (filed Dec. 2005)). 
241 ACLU of N.C., 639 S.E.2d at 139-40 ("Although ir cannot be predicted exactly when or 
how much rime will pass until a member of the ACLU-NC who would prefer ro swear on a holy 
text other than the Christian Bible is required to rake an oath in court, there is sufficient practi-
cal certainty char such a situation will occur." The appellate court noted that "by its refusal to 
permit witnesses to swear on any text other than the Christian Bible," the State had clearly 
demonstrated "its intent to continue the course of action," and concluded chat future litigation 
was not speculative. Furthermore, the court found there was no impediment to litigation be-
tween rhe ACLU of North Carolina and the State because the former had submitted "affidavits 
from eight of its members from Guilford County, eligible for jury duty, who are Jewish and 
would prefer to swear on rhe Old Testament rather than the Christian Bible. ACLU-NC further 
alleged that it has approximately 8,000 members throughout the state, many of whom are of 
Islamic or Jewish religious faith." The court agreed that the ACLU of North Carolina had 
sufficiently indicated its members' intent to avail themselves of their rights against a State policy 
that was not speculative, so that future litigation of the issue was not a matter of "if' but rather 
of "when."). 
242 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 12 n.4. The legislation, however, was never passed perhaps 
because the resolution of the case rendered the issue moot. 
243 Declaratory Judgment at 17, ACLU of N.C. v. North Carolina, No. 2005 CVS 9872 
(Super. Ct. Div. May 24, 2007), available at www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file287 _ 
2987v3.pdf. 
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Judge Ridgeway declined to interpret "Holy Scriptures" as any-
thing other than the Holy Bible.244 However, Ridgeway quoted James 
lredell's comments in the 1788 debate of the North Carolina ratifying 
convention, 245 in which Iredell indicated the holding of Omychund, that 
if the witness believed in a Supreme Being and a future state of rewards 
and punishments, "the oath is to be administered according to that form 
which it is supposed will bind his conscience most. "246 Even more signifi-
cant was the court's dependence on North Carolina case law, Shaw v. 
Moore, 247 an opinion of the state's Supreme Court dating from 1856. 
The Shaw case concerned an objection to a witness who believed in 
"the obligation of an oath on the Bible; in God and Jesus Christ,"248 but 
thought "that God would punish in this world all violators of his 
law ... but there would be no punishment after death. "249 After sur-
veying Coke's prohibition on non-Christian testimony, Lord Chief Jus-
tice Hale's exception for Jews, and the Omychund case, the Shaw court 
concluded that the rule of common law was that a non-Christian was a 
competent witness provided he believed in a Supreme Being who pun-
ishes the sinner.250 There was no requirement the witness needed to 
believe that punishment would occur in the next life. 251 If such was the 
common law rule of a non-Christian, the court reasoned, then certainly 
"the fact that this Christian believes the divine punishment will be in-
flicted in this world, and not in the world to come is immaterial."252 
The Shaw court then stated the legal question before it, which was 
whether this rule of common law was "changed by our statutory provi-
sions prescribing the form of oaths, ch. 76 Rev. Code."253 In the 
Mateen case, Judge Ridgeway noted that "ch. 76 Rev. Code" was none 
244 Id. at 4 ("There is no authority known to this court that suggests that under a plain 
meaning, historical or contextual analysis, the term 'Holy Scriptures,' panicularly when capital-
ized as in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 11-2, means anything other than the Holy Bible."). 
245 See supra notes 189-203 and accompanying text. 
246 Declaratory Judgment at 5, ACLU of NC., No. 2005 CVS 9872 (quoting 4 THE DE-
BATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES), supra note 163, at 197 (emphasis added by Judge Ridgeway). 
247 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 25 (1856). 
248 Id. at 26. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 29-31. 
2 5 1 Id. at 29 ("The great case of Omychund v. Barker, ... establishes the rule to be, that an 
infidel is a competent witness, provided he believes in the existence of a Supreme Being, who 
punishes the wicked, without reference to the time of punishment. The substance of the thing 
is, every oath must have a religious sanction."). 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
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other than the statute currently codified as N.C. Gen. Stat. § 11-1 et 
seq., and found that this was the very question before him, "[W]as the 
common law rule that witnesses are to be sworn in a form most sacred 
and obligatory upon their own religious senses abrogated by the enact-
ment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 11-2?"254 
Regarding the statute, the Shaw court stated, "we think it manifest, 
by a perusal of the Statute, that it was not intended to alter any rule of 
law," but rather "to prescribe forms, adapted to the religious belief of 
the general mass of the citizens, for the sake of convenience and uni-
formity."255 After reviewing the three alternatives for swearing or af-
firming under North Carolina law,256 the Shaw court made the 
following statement of moral outrage at the notion of prohibiting a per-
son from taking an oath because of his religious belief: 
[T]he argument that [the statute] was also intended to change the law 
by prohibiting any one from being sworn . . . would exclude both 
Jews, and infidels who believe in God. We think it indecent to suppose 
that the Legislature intended in an indirect and covert manner to alter a 
well-settled and unquestioned rule of law, and, in despite of the progress 
of the age, to throw the country back upon the illiberal and intolerant 
rule which was supposed to be the law in the time of bigotry; for, it 
was every days practice to swear Jews upon the Old Testament, and 
Omychund v. Barker had settled the rule that infidels are to be sworn 
according to the form which they hold to be most sacred and obligatory on 
their conscience. 257 
In his opinion for the Mateen case, Judge Ridgeway quoted this state-
ment in full, as well as the following, in which the Shaw court indicated 
that if indeed it found that the effect of the statute was to override the 
254 Declaratory Judgment at 7-8, ACLU of N.C. v. North Carolina, No. 2005 CVS 9872 
(Super. Ct. Div. May 24, 2007). 
255 Shaw, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) at 29. 
256 The Shaw court addressed all three alternatives for making an oath or affirmation under 
North Carolina law. The first was "suited to such as hold the ordinary tenets of the Christian 
religion; that is, an oath, laying the hand upon 'the Holy Evangelists, etc."' The second choice, 
"makes an exception in favor of chose Christians who have conscientious scruples against taking 
an oath on the Holy Evangelists, and the form of the oath is framed in reference to their belief." 
The third section makes an exception in favor of chose Christians who are Quakers, etc., and the 
form is framed in reference to their peculiar belief, 'swear not."' Id 
257 Declaratory Judgment at 8, ACLU ofN.C, No. 2005 CVS 9872 (quoting Shaw, 49 N.C. 
(4 Jones) at 30) (emphasis added by Judge Ridgeway). 
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common law established by Omychund, the statute would then violate 
the North Carolina Constitution in regard to religious freedom. 
If ... the Legislature had the purpose of altering the common law, so 
as to exclude Jews and infidels, who believe in a God, and Christians, 
who do not believe in future rewards and punishments, from the priv-
ilege of taking the oaths which are required to enable them to testify as 
witnesses, or to take any office or place of trust or profit, in other 
words, to degrade and persecute them for "opinion's sake," then it is 
clear, that the statute, so far as this purpose is involved is void and of no 
effect because it is in direct contravention of the 19 sec. of the Declaration 
of Rights: "That all men have a natural and inalienable right to wor-
ship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
consciences. "258 
The Shaw court went on to express its distaste for discriminating against 
non-Christian believers in God in regard to the oath, stating that if 
Omuychund had not, "relieved the common law from the reproach of 
holding Jews and infidels who believe in a God, unfit to take an 
oath, ... the effect of this section of our declaration of rights, would be, 
to extirpate the error and tear it up by the roots."259 
Finally, the Shaw case contemplated the effect of this discrimina-
tion on the oaths for public office, for to enjoin the oath of a non-
Christian would not only prevent the person from providing testimony, 
but: 
[N]ay, more, he cannot take the oath of office as a constable, sheriff, 
justice of the peace, judge, legislator or governor; in short, it would be 
the institution of a "test oath," towards which our revolutionary fa-
thers had so just an abhorrence, and which is wholly repugnant to the 
tolerant and enlightened spirit of our institutions and of the age in 
which we live. 260 
It is a remarkable irony that in the state whose history included Iredell' s 
eloquent arguments of 1789, citing Omychund, decided in 1744, and in 
the state whose legal precedent included Shaw v. Moore, decided in 
258 Id. (quoting Shaw, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) at 30) (emphasis added by Judge Ridgeway). Sec-
tion 19 of the North Carolina Declaration of Human Rights is now codified as Article I, section 
13, of the North Carolina Constitution. See supra note 238. 
259 Shaw, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) at 31. 
260 Id. 
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1856, that judges of that very same state should think that only the 
Bible could be used to swear an oath at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century.261 
u. Keith Ellison 
You know, it's like Jackie Robinson, did he worry about being the 
first black baseball player? No. He worried about getting a hit, he wor-
ried about getting on base.262 
It was January 4, 2007, moments after the entire 1 IOth Congress, 
according to congressional custom, was sworn in en masse on the floor 
of the House of Representatives.263 Democrat Keith Ellison, an African-
261 Perhaps it could be argued that Shaw was distinguishable from ACLU of North Carolina 
because the former concerned a Christian and the latter a Muslim, or that a great deal of Shaw's 
rhetoric was dicta. However, in a long footnote, Judge Ridgeway demonstrated that under 
North Carolina law, the Shaw case was not at all eccentric in finding that the form of the oath is 
of little consequence as long as the oath-taker or affirmation-maker understands the duty to tell 
the truth. In 1914, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated "[N.C. Gen Stat.§ 11-2], as to 
the manner of swearing is ... merely a form 'adapted to the religious belief of the general mass 
of citizens for the sake of convenience and uniformity."' State v. Pitt, 80 S.E. 1060, 1062 (N.C. 
1914). In 1922, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that as long as the trial judge was 
satisfied that witnesses understood the obligation to tell the truth, the "way in which they ex-
pressed their conception of such obligation was of secondary importance." Lanier v. Bryan, 114 
S.E. 6, 7 (N.C. 1922) See also State v. Boyles, 196 S.E. 850, 860 (N.C. 1938) ("[T]he decision 
(Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. 25) approves the doctrine that the witness should have the appreciation 
of a moral duty to tell the truth, and conforms to the general rule that the judgment of the trial 
judge on the question of competency of a person who is offered as a witness is a matter of 
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal."). Finally, in US. v. Looper, a case from the 
Western District of North Carolina, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "The common 
law ... requires neither an appeal to God nor the raising of a hand as a prerequisite to a valid 
oath. All that the common law requires is a form or statement which impresses upon the mind 
and conscience of a witness the necessity for telling the truth." U.S. v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 
1407 (4th Cir. 1969). The Looper court made it clear that no witness should be denied for not 
accepting a form of oath or affirmation designated by common law. Id. Rather, "All the district 
judge need do is to make inquiry as to what form of oath or affirmation would not offend 
defendant's religious beliefs but would give rise to a duty to speak the truth." Id. "The district 
judge could qualify defendant to testify in any form which stated or symbolized that defendant 
would tell the truth and which, under defendant's religious beliefs, purported to impress on him 
the necessity for so doing." Id. 
262 Good Morning America: New Congress, Big Changes Coming? (ABC television broadcast 
Jan. 4, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 172044 (Representative Keith Ellison, commenting on 
being the first Muslim elected to the U.S. House of Representatives and the first representative 
to take his oath of office on the Qur'an). 
263 Kevin Diaz & Brady Averill, A jubilant Day of Firsts in Congress, STAR TruB., Jan. 5, 2007, 
available at 2007 WLNR 229345. Brady Averill & Steven Thomma, CONGRESS: Holy Books 
Optional for Congressional Swearing-In, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 2, 2006, § A, available at 2006 
WLNR 20805868 ("The House speaker administers the oath to members en masse on the floor 
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American newly elected to the House from Minnesota's Fifth District, 
proceeded to take the oath again in a private, unofficial ceremony, as do 
many members of Congress wishing to have a photo-op for the event. 264 
Ellison's ceremonial swearing in, however, was not typical. It marked 
the first time a Muslim was to become a member of Congress.265 An-
other first that attracted media attention and controversy was his deci-
sion to take the oath of office on the Qur' an. 266 For the occasion he had 
requested the Library of Congress to provide the Qur' an that had been 
the property of Thomas Jefferson.267 
Ellison had made no secret of his religion or his plans to take the 
oath of office on the Qur' an during his campaign for the solidly demo-
cratic seat, which encompasses Minneapolis and is currently home to a 
high concentration of Muslims, including a Somali immigrant commu-
nity. 268 He had rather easily weathered attacks from his Republican op-
of the House of Representatives. It's up to individual members if they want to hold religious 
texts, said Fred Beutder, the House deputy historian. After the official swearing-in, members 
often have photos taken at a staged swearing-in ceremony in the speaker's office or their own 
offices, where they can place their left hands on sacred texts or hold them and have their families 
or religious leaders present, Beuttler said."). 
264 Averill & Thomma, supra note 263; Rochelle Olson, Fifth District Ellison s Win a First in 
Severa/Areas, STAR TRIB., Nov. 8, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 19480703. 
265 Neil MacFarquhar, Democrat Poised to Become First Muslim in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
8, 2006, § 1, available at 2006 WLNR 17420816. 
266 Jd. 
267 Brady Averill, Ellison to Bo"ow Qur'an Once Owned by Jefferson, STAR TRIB., Januaty 4, 
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 2203561. Nancy Pelosi, the female Speaker of the House (yet 
another first) administered the oath. Diaz & Averill, supra note 263. During Jefferson's Presi-
dency, the United States fought a war with four North African Muslim States, known collec-
tively as the Barbary Pirates. See FRANK LAMBERT, THE BARBARY WARS: AMERICAN 
INDEPENDENCE IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 137-70 (2005). It has been suggested that Jefferson 
owned a copy of the Qur'an in order to know his enemy. See., e.g., David Barton, An Historical 
Perspective on a Muslim Being Sworn into Congress on the Koran, http://www.wallbuilders.com/ 
resources/misc/ellison.pdf ("Why did Jefferson own a Koran? A simple answer is: To learn the 
beliefs of the enemies he was fighting.") Jefferson, however, bought the George Sale translation 
of the Qur'an from the Virginia Gazette in 1765, while he was still a student at the College of 
William and Mary. Kevin J. Hayes, How Jefferson Read the Qur'an, 39 EARLY AMERICAN LITER-
ATURE 247, 247 (2004); Library of Congress, Thomas Jefferson's Library, http://myloc.gov/ 
Exhibitions/jeffersonslibrary/Reason/ExhibitObjects/JeffersonsCopyoftheKoran.aspx. This was 
long before the first instance in which the Barbary Pirates captured an American vessel in 1784. 
LAMBERT, at 17-18. It appears that Jefferson's interest in the Qur'an had little to do with a 
desire to know Muslims as enemies. 
268 MacFarquhar, supra note 264 (quoting an Ellison supporter as stating, "If he wins, he will 
take the oath of office on a Koran," and adding, "The Fifth Congressional District is a Demo-
cratic citadel. The last Republican to represent it lost re-election in 1962 .... There are far 
larger communities of Muslims in the United States .... But few other Congressional districts 
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ponent, who repeatedly accused him of being a supporter of the Nation 
of Islam leader, Louis Farrakhan.269 Indeed, while a law student at the 
University of Minnesota, Ellison had written several articles under the 
pen name, Keith E. Hakim, one of which defended Farrakhan.270 Elli-
son, now an orthodox Sunni Muslim, reached out to the local Jewish 
community, repudiating Farrakhan as anti-Semitic, and explaining his 
affiliation with the Nation of Islam as a limited one spanning an eigh-
teen month period during which he helped to organize the Minnesota 
delegation to the Million Man March in 1995.271 
It was an editorial posted on the Townhallwebsite by the conserva-
tive radio talk-show host, Dennis Prager, soon after the election that 
sparked a much larger controversy. 272 The article contained several pro-
vocative pronouncements, not the least of which was its title, America, 
Not Keith Ellison, Decides What Book a Congressman Takes His Oath 
On.273 Prager went on to say that Ellison "should not be allowed to 
[take his oath of office on the Qur'an], not because of any American 
hostility to the Koran, but because the act undermines American civili-
zation."274 He proclaimed, "America should not give a hoot what Keith 
Ellison's favorite book is ... America is interested in only one book, the 
Bible. If you are incapable of taking an oath on that book, don't serve 
have such a high concentration. . . . Somalis starred arriving here in in 1993 as refugees fleeing 
the civil war in their country. Their number has grown to 120,000, with one fourth in the Fifth 
District."). For a map of Minnesota's Fifth District, see 5th District, KEITH ELLISON: REPRE-
SENTING MINNESOTA'S 5TH D1sTRJcr, http://ellison.house.gov/about/our-district {last visited 
March 8, 2014). 
269 MacFarquhar, supra note 265 ("Mr. Ellison's Republican opponent, Alan Fine, ... made 
a concerted effort to discredit him for previous ties to the Nation of Islam, the radical group 
founded by Louis Farrakhan, but experts do not expect Mr. Fine to pose a serious challenge."). 
Ellison defeated his opponents, Alan Fine and Tammy Lee, by ratios of almost three to one. 
Rochelle Olson, Fifth District Ellison's Win a First in Several Areas, STAR Trus., Nov. 8 2006, 
available at 2006 WLNR 19480703. 
270 MacFarquhar, supra note 265 (Ellison had converted from Catholicism to Islam while he 
was a student at Wayne State University). 
271 Id.; Rochelle Olson, First Muslim Congressman Seen As More Than a Lawmaker, Hous-
TON CHRON., Nov. 17, 2006, §A, 2006 WLNR 20002333 ("He's a Sunni Muslim, the largest 
denomination of Islam. Ellison doesn't drink alcohol or eat pork."). 
272 See generally THE DENNIS PRAGER SHOW, http://www.dennisprager.com/ (last visited 
March 8, 2014) (background on Mr. Prager}. 
273 ToWNHALL MAG. (Nov. 28, 2006), http://townhall.com/columnists/dennisprager/2006/ 
11 /28/ america,_not_keith_ellison,_decides_ what_book_a_congressman_takes_his_oath_on/ 
page/full/. 
274 Id. 
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in Congress."275 Perhaps the most inflammatory passage of the piece 
was a rhetorical question which implied an invidious comparison be-
tween the Qur'an and another book for which universal opprobrium is 
generally reserved: "Would they allow him to choose Hitler's 'Mein 
Kampf,' the Nazis' bible, for his oath?"276 Prager suggested that the 
substitution of the Qur' an for the Bible was a kind of moral terrorism, 
"doing more damage to the unity of America and to the value system 
that has formed this country than the terrorists of 9-11. "277 
Besides some rather tepid support from conservative quarters, a 
torrent of criticism from many quarters rained down on Prager' s 
head.278 The Council on American-Islamic Relations called upon the 
Holocaust Council, which oversees the United States Holocaust Memo-
rial Museum in Washington, to remove Prager from its board: "[N]o 
one who holds such bigoted, intolerant and divisive views should be in a 
275 Id. 
276 Id. Mr. Prager continued, "And if not, why not? On what grounds will those defending 
Ellison's right to choose his favorite book deny that same right to a racist who is elected to 
public office?" Id. Mr. Prager later denied that he was comparing the Qur'an with Mein Kampf 
Hannity & Colmes: Interview with Dennis Prager, Roy Sekoff, Sean Hannity, and Bob Beckel (Fox 
News television broadcast Jan. 4, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 186098. 
277 Prager, supra note 273 (" [I)t is an act of hubris chat perfeccly exemplifies multicultural 
activism - my culture trumps America's culture .... What Ellison and his Muslim and leftist 
supporters are saying is chat it is of no consequence what America holds as its holiest book, all 
that matters is what any individual holds to be his holiest book."). 
278 Not many public figures followed Prager's lead. Bue among chem was Virgil Goode, the 
Congressman who ironically represented the congressional district that includes Monticello, Jef-
ferson's home, and the University of Virginia, which Jefferson founded. Rep. Goode's Attack on 
Muslims in Government an Affront to Legacy of Thomas Jefferson Values, Traditions of Virginia, 
U.S. FED. NEWS (Dec. 28, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 22704377. To constituents who 
complained about Ellison's choice of book to swear by, Congressman Goode wrote, "When I 
raise my hand to cake the oath on Swearing In Day, I will have the Bible in my other hand. I do 
not subscribe to using the Koran in any way." Rex Bowman, Goode Stands By Comments About 
Muslims, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Dec. 21, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 22428428. 
"[If] American citizens don't wake up and adopt the Virgil Goode position on immigration 
there will likely be many more Muslims elected to office and demanding the use of the Koran." 
Id. Goode believes that a limitation on Muslim immigration is needed for American security. 
Noting that he kept the Ten Commandments and motto, "In God We Trust," on his office wall, 
Goode provided the following response to a Muslim student who asked him why he did not also 
have something about the Koran: "As long as I have the honor of representing the citizens of the 
5th District of Virginia in the United States House of Representatives, the Koran is not going to 
be on the wall of my office." Id. The American Family Association issued an "Action Alert" 
asking members to urge their congressmen to pass a constitutionally suspect law making "the 
Bible the book used in the swearing in ceremony of Representatives and Senators." Omar Sacir-
bey, Religion's Role in the American Political System Questioned in Debate over Oaths of Office, SuN 
HERALD (Biloxi, MS), Dec. 8, 2006, § B, available at 2006 WLNR 21192665. 
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policymaking position at a taxpayer-funded institution that seeks to ed-
ucate Americans about the destructive impact hatred has had, and con-
tinues to have, on every society."279 New York City's former Mayor, the 
late Ed Koch, agreed, calling Prager a "bigot" and a "schmuck,"280 ad-
ding, "Dennis Prager is not qualified to serve on the board of the U.S. 
Holocaust Council."281 The Anti-Defamation League called Prager's re-
marks, "intolerant, misinformed and downright un-American."282 The 
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism stated that Prager's criticism 
was "irreconcilable with American law and ideals as well as Jewish values 
and interests."283 
Prager's appearance on various talk shows did little to quiet this 
criticism. At a joint interview on CNN, UCLA Professor of Law, Eu-
gene Volokh, explained to Prager the legal untenability of his position: 
[T]he Constitution specifically says that you may refuse to use any 
book. . . . You may refuse even to give an oath. You m<>y affirm .... 
The purpose of an oath is not [to] affirm the correctness of the book 
that you use. The purpose of using a book is to invoke God as your 
witness and as a means of firming up your resolve to abide by the 
truth .... 284 
Here, as elsewhere, Volokh pointed out that requiring a person to take 
an oath of office on a particular religious text, as Prager demanded, 
"would impose an unconstitutional religious test. "285 
279 Frederic J. Frommer, Columnist Targeted in Quran Flap, PnTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 
Dec. 5 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 20975193. 
280 Kathleen Parker, Commentary, U.S. Will Survive One Hand on Koran, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 
13, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 21486089. See also Jennifer Siegel, Koch Calls for Prager's 
Ouster from Shoah Council, THE JEWISH DAILEY FORWARD, Dec. 8, 2006, available at http:// 
forward.co ml articles/9621 /koch-calls-for-pundi ts-ouster-from-shoah-council/ #. 
28 1 Ed Koch, Opinion, Keith Ellison, the Koran and Tolerance, JERUSALEM PosT, Dec. 14, 
2006, available at 2006 WL 22080944. 
282 Anti-Defamation League Comments on Dennis Prager's Attack on Muslim Congressman for 
Taking Oath of Office on Koran, U.S. FED. NEWS, (Dec. 1, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 
20809894. 
283 Reform Jewish Leader Supports First Muslim Member of Congress' Right to Take Oath of 
Office Using Koran, U.S. FED. NEWS (Dec. 4, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 21546918. 
284 Paula Zahn Now: Interview with Dennis Prager, Eugene Volokh (CNN television broadcast 
Nov. 30, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 20719461. 
285 Eugene Volokh, Oh Say, Can You Swear on a Koran?, NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Nov. 29, 
2006), http://www.nationalreview.com/ articles/219360/ oh-say-can-you-swear-koran/ eugene-
volokh. 
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Several pundits expressed their bemusement with Prager' s position. 
Tucker Carlson quipped, "Here we have a Jew pushing a Muslim to use 
the Christian Bible .... That's America."286 Bill Maher opined, "In 
this country, we put our hand on the Bible (or the Koran) and swear to 
uphold the Constitution, not the other way around."287 But perhaps 
Kevin J. "Seamus" Hasson, the President of the Becket Fund for Relig-
ious Liberty, most effectively captured the paradox of Prager' s tirade: "It 
makes no sense at all to ... violate the Constitution in order to [have 
someone] affirm his duty to uphold the Constitution."288 Not surpris-
ingly, Prager modified his views in his subsequent suggestion that Elli-
son could have taken his oath on both the Qur' an and the Bible, 289 and 
finally in expressing regret for some of what he had written. 290 The 
admission of regret does him credit. 
IV. RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF DIVERSITY 
A. Religious Expression in Testamentary and Other Courtroom Oaths 
Despite his ringing endorsement of Mateen' s right to make her 
testamentary oath on the Qur' an, Judge Ridgeway still had to deal with 
an issue whose significance he may have underestimated. In its argu-
ment against the freedom of witnesses to choose whatever text they want 
to swear upon, the State pointed out that a witness "may wish to be 
sworn on noxious texts, such as Hitler's Mein Kampf, under some 
286 World Sources Online, Tucker: Interview with Dennis Prager (MSNBC television broadcast 
Dec. 4, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 20999389. 
287 John Yewell, Ironic Twist on Religious Freedom, MONTEREY CoUNIY HERALD (Dec. 1, 
2006), § z, available at 2006 WLNR 20780106. 
288 Jane Lampman, At Swearing In, Congressman Wants to Carry Koran. Outrage Ensues, 
CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Dec. 7, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 21089102. 
2 89 Dennis Prager, A Respome to My Many Critics, and a Solution, ToWNHALL MAG. (Dec. 5, 
2006), http://rownhall.com/ columnists/ dennisprager/2006/ l 2/0 5/ a_response_ro_my _many_ 
critics_-_and_a_solution/page/full/ ("Why wouldn't Ellison bring a Bible along with the Koran? 
Thar he chose not to is the narcissism of multiculturalism that I referred to: The individual's 
culture trumps the national culture."). 
2 90 Dennis Prager, Worried About the Bible's Place in U.S., N.Y. JEWISH WEEK: MANHATTAN 
EDITION Qan. 5, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 1562186 ("There were sentences in that 
column that I regret writing and that deserved criticism. I was wrong in writing them. The 
most widely cited example is that Ellison 'should not be allowed to take his oath on the Koran.' 
I made clear in my next column and on my radio show the next day that I fully understand that 
any elected official has the legal right to rake his oath of office on any or no book. What I 
implied was clearly unconstitutional."). 
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strained claim of religious preference."291 One is reminded of Guilford 
County Judge Albright's concern that acceptance of the Qur'an as an 
instrument for courtroom oaths could eventually lead to the acceptance 
of such texts as the Book of Wiccan for this purpose. 292 In regard to 
Ellison's oath, the State's argument is also reminiscent of Prager's fear of 
the possibility that an elected official may choose Mein Kampf for the 
oath of office.293 Judge Ridgeway thought that through its inherent ju-
dicial authority a court could decide to exclude a religious text when 
"the individual's preference regarding their oath interferes with the ad-
ministration of justice by delaying or distracting the court or jury."294 
Judge Ridgeway's facile solution to this problem, however, brings 
the entire question of religious freedom in regard to a testamentary oath 
back to square one. The argument could be made that the choice of the 
Qur'an will distract a jury, particularly after any significant terrorist at-
tack in which the terrorists claim to be motivated by Islamic beliefs. 
Could a judge prohibit the use of the Qur'an for a testamentary oath if 
the judge determined that, under the circumstances of a particular pro-
ceeding, the Qur' an would be a distraction? What about a peculiar re-
ligious text claimed by a small, unpopular, religious minority, as 
opposed to the scripture of a major religion like Islam? After all, the 
initial hostility of the English judiciary to Quakers did not seem so un-
reasonable when the Society of Friends was still a persecuted sect whose 
refusal to swear oaths on grounds of conscience undercut what was be-
lieved to be a necessary means of eliciting truthful testimony. 295 
When the freedom to choose from a great variety of texts, sacred or 
profane, replaces the expectation of one standard religious text, or even a 
short list of texts, upon which witnesses are expected to swear testamen-
tary oaths, problems arise regarding court decorum, coercion, and juror 
29 1 Declaratory Judgment at 16, ACLU of N.C. v. North Carolina, No. 2005 CVS 9872 
(Super. Ct. Div. May 24, 2007). 
292 See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
293 See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
294 Declaratory Judgment at 16-17, ACLU of N.C., No. 2005 CVS 9872. 
295 Ryan C. MacPherson, Quakers in America: From Persecution to Toleration to Domination, 
RYANMACPHERSON .COM, http://www.ryancmacpherson.com/publications/26-research-papers/ 
7 4-quakers-in-america-from-persecution-through-toleration-to-domination.html (" [Quakers] 
faced imprisonment for the first refusal to take a [loyalty] oath; subsequent infractions could 
result in praemunire, or forfeiture of their property, both real and personal, to the king, whose 
prisoner the violator would remain. For their refusal to testify in court under oath, Quakers 
were generally convicted-not necessarily of the original charge brought against them, but 
rather of refusal to testify under oath. This, too, was cause for imprisonment."). 
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bias. Dean Milhizer posits this dilemma as the core reason for his con-
clusion that courts should not permit the use of religious artifacts in 
courtroom oaths.296 He argues that acceptance of such objects presents 
the court with the contradictory burdens of acceding "to an oath taker's 
request to use any artifact which he considers symbolic of his religious 
beliefs," and "restrict[ing] the use of the artifacts only to those that are 
deemed acceptable."297 If the court accedes to all such requests, there 
will inevitably be cases where an oath taker will insist upon using an 
artifact that will distract and offend most jurors. But if the court re-
stricts the use of such artifacts to what the court deems acceptable, the 
court would be exhibiting an apparent preference for religious beliefs 
over secular beliefs, or vice versa, or for some religious beliefs over 
others, both likely violations of the Establishment Clause. 298 
Let us suppose the court should decide that only religious artifacts 
are acceptable. The court will find it difficult, if not impossible, to find 
standards that, without stirring controversy, can effectively distinguish 
between religious objects and secular objects.299 If the court fails to find 
such criteria or declines to apply them, then witnesses may choose any 
secular objects they idiosyncratically believe would guarantee to the jury 
the truth of their testimony, ranging from philosophical texts to comic 
books.300 Even if the court were confident in its ability to decide 
whether a particular artifact is religious in nature, the court will not be 
able to prohibit minority religious artifacts that many would find offen-
sive and objectionable for an oath, such as objects representing New Age 
spirituality, Satanism, or witchcraft. 301 Milhizer's logic is inexorable. 
If some artifacts are allowed while others are excluded, this would ne-
cessitate the recognition and application of criteria for drawing such 
296 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 65-70. 
297 Id. at 65. 
298 "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which 
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Everson v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Ewing Twp., 33 U.S. l, 15 (1947). But see, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684, n.3 
(2005) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 533 U.S. 709 (2005)) ("[W)e have not, and do not, adhere 
to the principle that the Establishment Clause bars any and all governmental preference for 
religion over irreligion."; Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)). 
299 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 66. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 67. 
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distinctions. These criteria necessarily would involve a substantive 
and normative evaluation about the legitimacy, or at a minimum, the 
acceptability, of various religions and their artifacts. This implicates 
judgments about the genuineness and worthiness of faith traditions 
and their beliefs. Such decisions would involve imponderables and 
could be highly offensive.302 
361 
Even if there were a moral consensus about such decisions, the constitu-
tionality of acting upon it would be a never-ending source of difficulty 
and litigation. 303 
In a Note addressing the Matteen case, Daniel Blau focused on the 
coercive pressures at play when a non-Christian or non-religious juror or 
witness is confronted with the choice of oath or affirmation. 304 He re-
lates the story of John Sidoti, a long-time North Carolina resident who, 
as a defendant in small claims court, chose to affirm rather than swear 
an oath.305 The plaintiff in that case continuously badgered Sidoti for 
not putting his hand on the Bible and swearing, and claimed that Sidoti 
would lie.306 Sidoti had to ask the Magistrate to reprimand the plaintiff 
for returning to this issue after the court had accepted his affirmation. 307 
Later on, Mr. Sidoti appeared as a plaintiff in a civil case and again 
asked to affirm. 308 When he said he preferred not to raise his right hand 
because he thought the gesture expressed recognition of God, the judge 
"cocked her head to the side and stared at [him] as if to say [he] was 
weird."309 He thought he lost the case because of the judge's reac-
tion.310 The next time he appeared in court, he swore an oath because 
he feared the impression he would make if he again asked to affirm. 311 
He immediately regretted the decision to swear "to a god that [he] did 
not believe in."312 When later called as a juror, he asked to affirm rather 
than swear by the Bible.313 The clerk administering the juror oaths 
302 Id. ac 69. 
303 Id. 
304 Blau, supra noce 216, ac 252-60. 
305 Id. ac 252-54. 
306 Id. ac 252. 
307 Id. 
30s Id. 
309 Id. ac 252-53. 
310 Id. at 253. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. (Sidoti continued, "[A]nd ironically and paradoxically, [I] was swearing chat I 
wouldn't cell a lie!"). 
313 Id. 
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shouted, "We have one who wants to affirm," provoking a discussion 
with the judge about what to do with Mr. Sidoti.314 This made Sidoti 
feel self-conscious and wonder whether he had credibility with the other 
jurors.315 
Eventually Blau questions the constitutionality of permitting the 
religious oath in the courtroom.316 He acknowledges that the Supreme 
Court's leading decision that found religious expression unconstitu-
tional due to its coercive tendency, Lee v. Weisman, relied on the pres-
ence of school children,317 whereas in Marsh v. Chambers, the Supreme 
Court allowed prayer in the predominantly adult environment of a legis-
lative session.318 In these cases, the blanket assumption was that chil-
dren are vety impressionable, but adults, not so much, because they have 
the maturity to resist religious indoctrination. Blau, however, points 
out that, unlike the legislative setting of Marsh v. Chambers, the solem-
nity and litigious stakes of courtroom proceedings present particularly 
coercive forces likely to affect the decisions of adults, as in the case of 
Mr. Sidoti.319 It is, nevertheless, a difficult proposition to argue the 
unconstitutionality of the courtroom oath when the Constitution itself 
314 Id. 
315 Id. at 253-54 ("On my drive home I was very depressed and embarrassed that I had [been 
singled out], and that the coun had not explained to anyone that affirming, rather than swear-
ing, was an option. In fact, from all appearances, the way the Bibles were methodically laid out 
as if by rote, [suggested that] this was the only way to become a juror. At least if affirmation 
were stated by the coun as an option, that would have given my act some credibility, and [would 
not have made] me feel like the only outsider to be on the jury."). Cf Epstein, supra note 153, 
at 2146-47 (Epstein makes much the same point about the coercive powers of the counroom: 
"A witness or juror who does not believe in the Christian Bible, in swearing to God, or in the 
God envisioned in the oath, must publicly declare her disbelief in front of (and with the likely 
perception of disapproval of) a judge and her fellow citizens. If the government is forbidden 
from coercing a statement of belief, it should be equally forbidden from coercing a confession of 
nonbelie£ "). 
316 Blau, supra note 216, at 244-65. 
317 Leev. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992). See also Blau, supra note 216, at 258 ("Skep-
tics of the coercion argument argue that the types of coercive pressures present in Lee are absent 
in [oath] ceremonies. In Lee, the Court found that indirect coercive pressures were at work 
because of the setting in which the religious exercise took place: a high school graduation cere-
mony. The coun noted that teenagers, especially sensitive to peer pressure in social situations, 
were more likely to be coerced into conformity and panicipation in the religious exercise."). 
3l8 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See also Blau, supra note 216, at 258 (citing 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792) ("In contrast, in Marsh v. Chambers, the Court found that adults are 
'presumably not readily susceptible to "religious indoctrination" ... or peer pressure.'"). 
319 Blau, supra note 216, at 259 ("While an adult juror or witness may be less susceptible to 
religious indoctrination, the pressure to conform is greatly increased when it takes place in a 
counroom. For a witness who commands the attention of the judge, court officials, parties to 
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provides for the choice of oath or affirmation, not only for the oath of 
office of the president and other public officials, but also for a quasi-
judicial legislative proceeding like the impeachment of the president.320 
The most cogent reason to prohibit religious artifacts in the testa-
mentary oath is the effect, which differences in choice of religious arti-
fact would have on the jurors who assess the credibility of a witness's 
testimony. Milhizer briefly notes this effect: "Unusual or elaborate 
forms of oaths, and controversial and offensive artifacts ... could un-
duly detract from the credibility of a witness based on an expression of 
his religious beliefs when taking his oath."321 And in his contentions 
about coercion, Blau indirectly implicates the effect the religious expres-
sion of an oath may have on a jury as a factor which may coerce a 
witness deciding whether to swear or affirm: 
[A] witness feels compelled to swear on the Bible so that the jury 
will believe and give proper weight to his or her testimony. This coer-
cion is especially problematic when a defendant testifies on his or her 
own behalf, for his or her own fate is at stake when the bailiff ap-
proaches with a Bible. . . . In the post-September 11 world, ... an 
Islamic defendant will be acutely aware of the fact that he or she may 
greatly damage his or her testimony by exercising the right to swear an 
oath to Allah on the Qur' an. 322 
Even if it is assumed that adult witnesses will not be coerced into using 
or not using religious artifacts in their testamentary oaths (and, of 
the litigation, and most importantly, a jury of his or her peers, the social pressure to swear a 
religious oath may be overwhelming."). 
320 The phrase "oath or affirmation" occurs three times in the Constitution: U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 3, cl. 6 (for impeachments: ''The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. 
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation."); U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, 
cl. 9 (for the president's oath of office: "Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall 
take the following Oath or Affirmation: - 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully 
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'"; U.S. CONST. art. VI (for the oath 
of office of federal and state officials: "The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and 
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the 
United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States."). The first instance, regarding impeachment, is the quasi-
judicial situation referred to in the text. However, it is acknowledged that this choice is for a 
type of juror oath or affirmation as opposed to a witness oath or affirmation. 
321 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 67-68. 
322 Blau, supra note 216, at 256-57. 
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course, some will), juror influence is still a problem. The unscrupulous 
witness, to whom the choice of oath or affirmation makes no difference, 
will choose the form of oath or affirmation she believes will have the 
greatest effect in persuading the jury she is telling the truth. On the 
other hand, the sincere witness will choose the form of oath or affirma-
tion dictated by her conscience, and will fortuitously receive the advan-
tage or disadvantage of the jury's preference. It is true that juries are 
routinely told and expected to disregard information obtained outside 
the trial, or testimony for which an objection has been sustained. But if 
a courtroom oath, dressed up in religious symbols and expression, in 
and of itself is a source of bias, prejudice, and a lack of objectivity, the 
court achieves greater impartiality by keeping the religiously laden oath 
out of court proceedings entirely, especially if the oath is not necessary. 
Much of the coercive effect that Blau recounts is due to or magni-
fied by the presence of religious artifacts in the courtroom, which 
Milhizer would remove. But Milhizer, if not Blau, is cognizant of the 
advantages custom and tradition have found in the oath, advantages that 
would largely be lost should a rule prohibiting religious artifacts in the 
courtroom be adopted.323 He observes that "[religious artifacts] can en-
hance an oath's substantive effectiveness, ... [by] bind[ing] the taker's 
conscience and emphasiz[ing] his duty to tell the truth."324 Not only 
does the religious dimension of the oath influence the religious con-
science of certain witnesses to be truthful, but "[f]or fact-finders and the 
broader public, witness oaths ... can remedy a defect, namely, some 
man's lack of belief in another man. An invocation of 'God' as part of 
an oath helps satisfy others that the oath taker's conscience has at least 
presumptively been awakened to the duty to tell the truth."325 & Na-
dine Farid, another commentator on the Mateen case states, "The pro-
tection offered the witness in the taking of the oath serves to comfort 
the jury as well; it is the hallmark of the witness's earnestness."326 
But inherent in the very advantage of creating jury confidence 
based on the religious dimension of the oath is the disadvantage about 
which Milhizer and Blau complain. The jury's belief that the religious 
expression of an oath renders testimony more credible is prejudicial, for 
the belief that the religious expression of the oath indicates the truthful-
323 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 64-65. 
324 Id. at 64. 
325 Id at 59. 
326 Farid, supra note 216, at 560. 
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ness of the witness is most likely to be held by jurors who share religious 
belief with the witness. For the believer in God who has no objection to 
taking an oath, its religious dimension does not present a problem. But 
for the witness who does not believe or merely objects to the oath, the 
availability of the oath is unfair. Such a witness would have to take the 
oath insincerely or under duress in order to gain the same credibility as 
other witnesses who, sincerely or not, take the oath. And for the witness 
who, as a matter of conscience, will not take the oath, it is then an 
instrument that is unavailable to convince the jury of truthfulness, 
though such a person may be as truthful as the most sincere oath-taker. 
Milhizer proposes a solution: "An Invocation of God Without the 
Use of Artifacts."327 This solution entails the prohibition of religious 
artifacts so that witnesses do not have a choice of any articles on which 
to swear, but are only allowed to invoke "a public, generic reference to 
the divine."328 This solution would diminish the seriousness of the 
problems that Milhizer discusses, but does not eliminate them alto-
gether. There would remain those who will not be comfortable invok-
ing God at all, as the term is generally understood in a predominantly 
western, Christian country such as the United States.329 If there is a 
valid concern that members of certain minority religions and nonbe-
lievers will want to use religious artifacts that the majority may find 
objectionable, it is then also a valid concern that some witnesses will not 
want to use the term, "God," and as a result be limited to choosing only 
between that particular religious expression or an affirmation, which is 
327 Milhizer, supra note 46, at 70. 
328 Id 
329 The conscientious objector case, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1963), has a 
discussion about the meaning of "Supreme Being." Here, conscientious objectors claimed ex-
emption from military combatant training on the basis of "religious training and belief'' defined 
as "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being" in § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and 
Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958). Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164. However, the conscien-
tious objectors could not claim that they believed in a Supreme Being. Id at 164-69. Afrer 
reviewing the writings of various theologians and clerics on the nature of God, Justice Clark 
wrote in the majority opinion, "[t)hese are but a few of the views that comprise the broad 
spectrum of religious beliefs found among us. But they demonstrate very clearly the diverse 
manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated." 
Id. at 183. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas reviewed the beliefs of Hindus and Bud-
dhists about God, finding these to be distinct from that of an "orthodox religionist." Id. at 193 
(Douglas,]., concurring). He opined that subjecting the religious beliefs of some but not others 
to penalties would be would be discrimination that violated the free Exercise Clause, equal 
protection, and Due Process. Id at 188. 
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the Mateen problem all over again.330 Should witnesses be allowed to 
replace the term, "God," with some other term or religious formulation, 
then the problem presented by distracting or offensive religious artifacts 
has not been solved at all. 
For the purposes of optimizing juror impartiality, it may be best to 
eliminate any reference to the deity and provide only an affirmation, 
which a person makes under the worldly penalties of perjury. Thus the 
bailiff in administering the oath will not mention God. What if the 
juror, on his own, adds "So help me God," or some other religious or 
secular formulation in repeating the affirmation? Only under these nar-
row circumstances may the court exercise its inherent power to maintain 
proper decorum under the circumstances and decide whether the addi-
tion to the affirmation is too obtrusive or distracting to be permitted. 
Though the Constitution might not require the court to impose 
upon itself or upon witnesses these limitations, the practical concerns of 
a religiously diverse society suggest that a universal affirmation is the 
most practical way to achieve impartiality among the jurors. In an age 
where witnesses are entitled to choose whatever artifacts or expression 
they think will best demonstrate their truthfulness and candor, any ad-
vantage the religious oath may afford for extracting the truth from the 
witness and creating jury confidence in testimony is likely to be out-
weighed by the advantage of avoiding as much as possible bias regarding 
the witnesses' choice. Regarding conscientious witnesses, religious or 
not, truthfulness will still have the advantage of the general admonitions 
of most religions, and of most secular systems of morality, not to men-
tion modern investigative devices and the penalties for perjury, that a 
person be truthful in bearing witness. 331 
B. Religious Expression in the Oath of Office 
In his article on ceremonial deism, Epstein lumps the oath of office 
with the testamentary oath as forms of ceremonial deism likely to offend 
the Establishment Clause, arguing that both are violative of the Estab-
lishment Clause.332 In applying Establishment Clause jurisprudence to 
330 See supra notes 215-234 and accompanying text. 
331 See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text, discussing Madison's view that an oath is 
itself a private test of one's truthfulness. 
332 Epstein, supra note 153, at, 2144-47 (Epstein sets up his analysis with an examination of 
the Supreme Coun's Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
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several instances of what he identifies as "Core Ceremonial Deism,"333 
Epstein treats the "Oaths of Public Officers, Court Witnesses and Ju-
rors. "334 Regarding the oath of office, he writes: 
When the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court asks the President-elect 
to place his left hand on the Christian Bible . . . and to swear the 
words "so help me God," nonadherents cannot help but feel left 
out. In this one act, the highest officials of two branches of the federal 
government, in an official ceremony like none other in this country, 
through word and act, embrace the Christian Bible and the God envi-
sioned therein. It is difficult to understand why Torcaso v. Watkins 
does not compel the conclusion that this practice violates the Estab-
lishment Clause. 335 
In 2008, Michael Newdow brought at least part of Epstein's contention 
to court when he filed a complaint in federal court alleging that it was 
unconstitutional for Chief Justice Roberts to prompt President-elect 
Obama with the words "So help me God" in the presidential oath of 
office.336 The Constitution provides that the president may take an 
oath or affirmation and provides the words for the ceremony, but it does 
not include any mention of "So help me God," or of swearing upon any 
religious book.337 Though Newdow did not challenge the president-
elect's choice to include the words, he objected to the Chief Justice's 
prompt.338 Newdow argued that in administering the presidential oath, 
333 Id. at 2137-54. 
334 Id. at 2144-47. 
335 Id. at 2145. 
336 Complaint, Newdow v. Robens, No. 1:08-CV-02248-RBW (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2008) 
(Newdow lost the case). 
337 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 9. See also Complaint at 24, 26, Newdow, No. 1:08-CV-
02248-RBW. 
101. The oath of office for the President of the United States is specified in the 
Constitution's Article II, Section 1. ... 
102. It is to be noted that the words, "so help me God" are not included in this 
oath .... 
110. Absent constitutional amendment, there is no authority to alter the text of the 
Constitution, the 
provisions of which are "fixed and exclusive." United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 
514 U.S. 779, 790 (1995) .... 
338 Id. at 21 ("The President, like all other individuals, has Free Exercise rights, which might 
permit such an alteration."). 
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the Chief Justice speaks for the United States government. 339 Therefore, 
his utterance of "So help me God" amounted to a government approval 
of religious belief forbidden by the Establishment Clause.340 Indeed, 
though George Washington is commonly said to have uttered these 
words at the first presidential inauguration, there is no contemporary 
account or evidence indicating he did so, and no one made such a claim 
until the 1850's.341 Aside from Washington, there is no convincing evi-
dence that any President used the words at subsequent inaugurations 
until Chester A. Arthur did so in 1884, after which the practice eventu-
ally became customary.342 
To some extent, the use of religious artifacts and expression in 
oaths for public office raise the same problems of coercion, offense, and 
bias that the use of such artifacts and expression present in court. Some 
politicians may feel compelled to use religious artifacts and verbiage in 
which they have no particular belief because to do otherwise would 
alienate constituencies the majority of whom are believers. Other politi-
cians may manipulate the support of their constituencies with religious 
339 Id at 24 (arguing that when "So help me God" is recited "by the Chief Justice of the 
United States as part of the inauguration of the President, it wields enormous power in reinforc-
ing the false notion that the United States is a nation where Monotheism is officially preferred, 
thus stigmatizing Plaintiffs and others who hold contrary religious views."). 
340 Id at 29 ("[The] addition of'so help me God' to the constitutionally prescribed presiden-
tial oath of office violates every Establishment Clause test enunciated by the Supreme Court 
.... "). 
34 I Id at 20 ("There is no contemporaneous account supporting this claim, which was first 
made in 1854, apparently on the basis of a recollection of Washington Irving. Irving was six 
years old in 1789, when the first inaugural was held. A historical claim based upon nothing but 
the alleged recollection of a six year old, first made more than six decades later, is of highly 
questionable validity. Combined with the fact that Irving's report of where he was standing 
during the inauguration would have made it impossible for him to have heard the oath at all, 
that validity falls to zero."). For discussions of the historical evidence for "So help me God" in 
the presidential oath, see So Help Me God in Presidential Oaths, NONBELIEVER ANTIDISCRIMINA-
TION PROJECT, http://www.nonbeliever.org/commentary/inaugural_shmG.html; and Frederick 
B. Jonassen, Kiss the Book . .. You 're President. . . ": So Help Me God''and Kissing the Book in the 
Presidential Oath of Office, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 853 (2012) (pointing our that though 
Washington may not have uttered, "So help me God," there is contemporary historical evidence 
that he kissed a Bible, which was a gesture traditionally associated with the religious expression 
of an oath). 
342 Peter R. Henriques, A George Washington Myth That Should Be Discarded, GEORGE MA-
SON HIST. NEWS NETWORK Oan. 11, 2009), http://www.hnn.us/articles/59548.html ("The 
first clearly documented case of a President adding the words, 'So Help Me God,' was recorded 
- when Chester A. Arthur took the oath in 1881."). 
See also, So Help Me God in Presidential Oaths, supra note 341; Jonassen, supra note 341, at 893-
94. 
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symbols.343 There may also be politicians who adhere to a minority 
religion, and will therefore refrain from taking an oath reflecting their 
faith in order to avoid offense. Would it not be preferable to regard any 
government complicity in the administration of a God-referencing oath 
as an Establishment Clause violation, and therefore ban religious arti-
facts and religious expression, such as the phrase, "So help me God," 
from any official oath ceremony? 
Though there is a degree of influence that the religious preferences 
of constituencies may impose upon public officials, eliminating religious 
artifacts or expression from oath of office ceremonies would have less 
effect in reducing this influence than such a ban would have in the 
courtroom. Jurors do not usually know the religious beliefs of witnesses 
who testify before them. However, the public generally knows the relig-
ious affiliations of candidates for office, whether the candidates make a 
point of advertising their religion or not. The acceptability of a candi-
date's religious beliefs is likely to have already been decided by the elec-
torate long before administration of the oath of office. The decision of 
a public official, then, to incorporate any religious expression in the oath 
is not coerced to the same degree that such a decision might be for a 
witness in the courtroom. 
In an effort to minimize bias and maximize impartiality, a trial 
court typically exercises strict control over what the jury sees and hears. 
The court therefore focuses the jury on what the court considers mate-
rial evidence and pertinent law so that the jury may reach the fairest 
verdict possible. There are no such limitations on information in the 
hurly burly of the competition for public office. In that context, a poli-
tician is not providing testimony that affects the interests of others, let 
alone a court's interest in fairness. Instead, the politician is selling him-
self and his ideas, and both are subject to freewheeling public criticism 
however biased or prejudiced that criticism may be. No court oversees 
343 See Martin Jay Medhurst, "God Bless the President": The Rhetoric oflnaugural Prayer 62 
(Aug. 1980) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, The Pennsylvania State University) (on file with 
author) (presenting several examples of presidential prayers, which exploited religious expression 
for political points. For example, Medhurst relates that Jack Valenti, who served as an aide to 
President Johnson, requested the clergymen who were to provide prayers at Johnson's 1965 
inauguration submit drafts of the prayers beforehand. In the case of Dr. George R. Davis, who 
was a minister of the National City Christian Church in Washington, D.C., Medhurst presents 
evidence that Dr. Davis offered four drafts from which Valenti chose a version and suggested 
revisions. "[T]he actual effect of the prior submission and oversight may never be known, but 
the very fact that submissions were required, suggestions made, and revisions scrutinized testifies 
to the ease with which inaugural prayer could be turned to partisan political ends."). 
370 CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICS J [Vol. 12:303 
what public officials say, or advises the public about how to reach a 
decision on the vote. Public officials have greater discretion about what 
they say and take responsibility for any resultant success or failure with 
their constituents. Under such circumstances, freedom of expression, 
including religious expression, outweighs the concern for coercion, or 
offense, or bias. This being the case, the only concern is that of drawing 
a line between the public official's freedom to express personal beliefs 
and the constitutional prohibition that the government remain neutral 
on matters of religion. 
As indicated above, the Constitution implies its acceptance or "im-
primatur" for testamentary oaths on the basis of the choice between 
oath and affirmation, which the founding document repeatedly permits 
even for quasi-judicial legislative proceedings.344 However, the Consti-
tution quite explicitly permits the oath in providing this choice for the 
presidential oath of office and for the oath of loyalty to the federal gov-
ernment that the Constitution requires federal and state officials to 
take.345 In order for this choice to have any meaning, the oath must 
include religious expression; and the affirmation, no religious expres-
sion. If this were not the case, the choice would be meaningless. Fur-
thermore, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, Iredell defined 
the oath as "a solemn appeal to the Supreme Being ... by a person who 
believes in the existence of a Supreme Being and in a future state of 
rewards and punishments. "346 The understanding of an oath, then, that 
was contemporary to the composition and ratification of the Constitu-
tion, and applicable to the founding document itself, was religious in 
nature.347 
Seth Barrett Tillman has pointed out that because the oath is a 
promise predicated on religion, the presence of the choice of taking an 
oath in the Constitution is an acknowledgement of religious belief.348 
344 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 6. 
345 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 9 & art. VI. 
346 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS supra note 163, at 196. 
347 See also, WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 112-
1309 (Liberty Fund 2002) (1785) ("It is the calling upon God to witness, i.e. to take notice of, 
what we say, and it is invoking his vengeance, or renouncing his favour, if what we say be false, 
or what we promise be not performed."). 
348 Seth Barrett Tillman, Blushing Our Way Past Historical Fact and Fiction: A Response to 
Professor Geoffrey R Stone's Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture and Essay, 114 PENN. ST. L. 
REv. 391, 395-96 (2009) ("What is the difference between an oath and affirmation? The 
consensus view-and as far as I know the universal view-is that the former is taken in God's 
name, but the latter is not. The purpose of the clause-according to the standard narrative-
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Though this may be an indirect acknowledgement, it has the effect of 
securing a place for religious expression at the inauguration of any pub-
lic official in the United States. In thus accommodating religious ex-
pression in the oath of office, the Constitution permits the government 
to likewise accommodate officials who wish to take the oath on a relig-
ious artifact with religious expression. 
Perhaps this application of what an oath meant at the time when 
the Constitution was ratified in combination with the argument of what 
the choice between oath and affirmation means is nothing more than a 
rather rigid example of originalist reading which should give way to in-
terpreting the Constitution as a living document. As Epstein observes: 
The Supreme Court has recognized ... that the Constitution is not a 
static document frozen in time and constricted by the predilections of 
those who framed it. Were it otherwise, African-Americans would still 
be subjected to Jim Crow laws, segregated schools, and miscegenation 
statutes; women would not be entitled to the protections of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 349 
However, in this particular instance, a decision to remove the choice of 
an oath provided in the Constitution is not simply an expansion of 
rights to a racial minority or to women. It is the removal of a freedom, 
which the Constitution gives to the oath-taker to incorporate a religious 
element in accepting the responsibility of office. In collapsing oath and 
affirmation to what in effect is affirmation only, the government would 
be making the choice of oath or affirmation for the office holder, and in 
so doing the government would be supporting a nonreligious personal 
commitment to keep a promise as opposed to a religious personal com-
mitment to do so. This would be a preference for no religion as op-
posed to religion. To achieve neutrality, the government would do 
better to accommodate oath or affirmation as long as the choice remains 
with the public official who is taking the oath of office. 
In spite of its reliance on the Establishment Clause, Torcaso v. Wat-
kins does not compel the conclusion that the president's religious oath 
violates the Establishment Clause because a choice cannot be a test. In 
was to permit Quakers and others having a religious or other conscientious objections to oath-
taking to also hold public office. The purpose is one of inclusiveness and tolerance, but it is also 
a textual reference to God in our public chaner-albeit an indirect one."). See also Seth Barrett 
Tillman, Blushing Our Way Past History, 2009 CARDOZO L. REv. DE Novo 46, 48 (2009). 
349 Epstein, supra note 153, at 2155-56. 
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regard to public office, the Constitution does not make the choice of 
oath or affirmation for the public official. It leaves the choice to the 
public official. In doing so, the Constitution also leaves it up to the 
electorate to decide what kind of promises the electorate finds accept-
able. It does not choose for them. Indeed, it is regrettable that the 
public might favor an oath that is made on a particular book of scrip-
ture. But the gradual acceptance of diverse religious oaths and nonreli-
gious affirmations suggests that the Founding Fathers may eventually be 
proven wise in giving the public this choice, rather than making the 
choice for the public. Perhaps in the future an oath taken on the Bible 
will be a rarity, and the affirmation will predominate. As long as there is 
a choice, and no test, officials will be able to choose, and no law will 
impose any particular test of religious belief or nonbelief. So, Josh was 
right: under the Constitution, a president may choose to swear upon 
Sports Illustrated. And it is up to the people to decide if the elected 
official's choice makes any difference to them.350 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with an episode from a television series about 
what Bible the President would use to swear his oath on. For all the 
fussing over finding a Bible that would suitably convey the solemnity of 
the historical tradition, the President ended up with a Bible that was 
probably pilfered from Donnie's hotel. In the end, the particular copy 
of the book was not as important as the character of the man who 
would decide whether there would be war or peace and the quality of 
his word. The oath of office is both a highly personal statement relevant 
to the individual's commitment to the promise made, and also a public 
statement, relevant to the governmental office to be assumed.351 Person-
ally, the expression of the promise, in religious or non-religious terms, 
with or without a particular religious text, may matter a great deal to the 
350 In the state conventions that ratified the Constitution, several speakers, while skeptical 
that a non-Protestant or non-Christian could become president, nevertheless admitted the re-
mote possibility, but relegated this decision to the electorate. See supra note 196. 
351 Steve Sheppard, What Oaths Meant to the Framers' Generation: A Preliminary Sketch, 2009 
CA!loozo L. R.Ev. DE Novo 273, 276 (2009) ("The oath, by definition, is created by a public 
institution, indeed drafted by officials of those institutions, but it must be caken personally by 
the individual, who is required to perform the office with particular care and (sometimes im-
pliedly and sometimes explicitly) for the benefit of che public. This duality in [sic] inherent in 
the 'subscription' by which a person takes an oath, and the 'office' that requires the oach icsel£ "). 
See also STEVE SHEPPARD, I Do So SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MoRAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL 
OFFICIALS 105-09 (2009). 
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individual taking the oath. It is a promise of the Constitution, which is 
gradually but fortunately coming to pass that oath-takers may freely 
choose the personal expression and form of their commitments. In re-
gard to the good of the public, what is really important is something 
that these choices of oath or affirmation only vaguely and uncertainly 
reflect: the person taking the oath. "It is not the oath that makes us 
trust the person, but the person who makes us trust the oath."352 
352 2 AEscHYLus, TRAGEDIES AND FRAGMENTS, No. 276, at 188 (Edward Hayes Plumptre 
trans., 1901). See also ]OHN BARnETr, BARTLETr's FAMILIAR QuoTATIONS, No. 8464 (10th 
ed. 1919). 
